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DRUGS AND VACCINES FOR THE COMMON
DEFENSE: REFINING FDA REGULATION TO
PROMOTE THE AVAILABILITY OF
PRODUCTS TO COUNTER BIOLOGICAL
ATTACKS
Gail H. Javitt*
"Biological terrorism is more likely than ever before and far more greatly
to be feared than explosives or chemicals."
- D.A. Henderson'
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1991 Gulf War heightened military concerns about biological
warfare. As a result of intelligence gained regarding Iraq's biological
weapons stockpile and research program, as well as information obtained
about the former Soviet Union's clandestine bioweapons program, the
Department of Defense (DOD) began to intensify its focus on biowarfare
defense. DOD was particularly concerned about protecting the U.S.
military from exposure to biological agents, and in 1997 former Secretary
of Defense Cohen ordered the-vaccination of all troops against anthrax.
Domestically, however, little attention was paid to the possibility of a
bioterrorist attack against U.S. cities until very recently. 2 In the last few
years of his administration, President Clinton made combating
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1. Ruth SoRelle, U.S. Lacks Preparation to Battle Biological Terrorism,
Expert Says, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1998, at A8.
2. David R. Franz & Russ Zajtchuk, Biological Terrorism: Understanding the
Threat, Preparation, and Medical Response, 46 Disease-a-Month 125 (2000).
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bioterrorism a top administration priority.3 Action on his initiatives was
limited, however, because of opposition from Congress' and questions
regarding the significance of the threat being addressed.5 The government
also appeared ill-prepared to counter the effects of a bioterrorist event, as
evidenced by a 1999 report by the General Accounting Office criticizing
several governmental agencies for mismanaging the medical stockpiles
developed to protect the public from biological weapons.6
In the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of 9/11
and the distribution of anthrax-laden letters to the U.S. Congress and
several news organizations, the threat of biological attacks against both
military and civilian targets is widely acknowledged as significant, and one
that the United States may at present be inadequately equipped to meet.
While the biowarfare threat faced by the military and the bioterrorism
concern faced by the civilian population have several distinct
characteristics, they share a common irreducible element: the need for safe
and effective prophylactic treatments and antidotes.
In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
charged with ensuring the safety and effectiveness of the therapeutic
arsenal, which comprises drugs, medical devices and vaccines and other
biological products. FDA approval is required before such products may
be commercially distributed in interstate commerce, regardless of whether
their intended recipients are military personnel or civilians. In addition,
3. See e.g., Laurie Garrett, Plan to Fight New Terrorism, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23,
1999, at A4; James Benet, Clinton Tells of Antiterrorism Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 1998, at A12.
4. For example, in 1999 the Clinton administration asked Congress to require
U.S. laboratories to list all their dangerous biological agents, including anthrax,
with the federal government, but the proposal failed because of fears that it would
inhibit medical research. Aaron Zitner, Clinton's 1999 Proposal That Labs Be
Required to List All Their Dangerous Agents Failed to Win Congress' OK, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at A13.
5. See e.g., Daniel S. Greenberg, The Bioterrorism Panic, J. CoM., Mar. 23,
1999, at 5A; Anthony Shadid, Funding on Rise for Research into Bioterrorism,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2001, at Al (noting that "critics have questioned such a
substantial investment in a public health threat that.., remains, by most accounts,
highly unlikely"); Neil C. Livingstone, Clinton Anti-Terror Plan is Correct,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1999, at A37 (noting that the Administration's proposals "have
been criticized as unnecessary and too costly, designed to frighten the public and
usurp traditional civilian authority.").
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, COMBATING
TERRORISM: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE POORLY
MANAGED (1999).
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FDA authorization is necessary before products under development may
be tested on humans for their potential therapeutic effect.
In light of FDA's central regulatory role, the agency is integral to any
national preparedness strategy for military and homeland defense against
biological agents. However, FDA has not traditionally viewed its primary
role as protection of national security, nor do its statutory authorities
explicitly contemplate this function. Moreover, FDA-DOD interactions
during the Gulf War raised concerns about whether FDA had sacrificed
the safety of military personnel for the benefit of military objectives. The
recent concerns over the availability of the anthrax vaccine have revealed
longstanding vulnerabilities in the U.S. vaccine industry - vulnerabilities
to which FDA may have been insufficiently prepared to respond. Given
the circumstances now facing the nation, it is critical to examine the
impact that FDA requirements exert on military and homeland security
efforts to combat bioterrorism and to determine whether changes in these
requirements could facilitate military and homeland defense needs.
This article discusses FDA's role in regulating products to counter
biological attacks. It explores FDA requirements pertaining to these
products, and the impact of these requirements on product availability. It
reviews historical difficulties -legal, ethical and scientific-surrounding
the availability and provision of products to counter bioterrorism to those
at risk. It also discusses previous efforts by FDA to change its regulatory
requirements and expedite product availability in response to emerging
threats, as well as the way in which these changes can be applied to
products to counter bioterrorism.
This article identifies and briefly describes five areas in which FDA
should develop new initiatives to foster the availability of products for
military and homeland defense, including those to counter biological
attacks. First, FDA should establish a new office of products for military
and homeland defense, to review and approve new products for this
purpose. Second, FDA should create a new interim category of product
approval for products for military and homeland defense use. Third, FDA
should expand the applicability of its fast track approval process to include
products for military and homeland defense. Fourth, FDA should impose
time limits on Investigational New Drug (IND) applications to encourage
the filing of new product applications and prevent products from
remaining in a perpetually investigational status. Finally, FDA should
deem products for military and homeland defense eligible for orphan drug
designation in order to encourage the development of new products
unlikely to be commercially viable.
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II. DIMENSIONS OF THE THREAT
A. Background: CDC List of Biological Agents
The Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
maintain a list of biological agents and associated diseases categorized by
level of threat. Agents in category A are considered to pose a significant
threat to national security because they: (1) can be easily disseminated or
transmitted from person to person; (2) result in high mortality rates and
have the potential for a major public health impact; (3) might cause public
panic and social disruption; and (4) require special action for public health
preparedness. Agents currently included in category A are: (1) anthrax
(bacillus anthracis); (2) botulism (botulinum toxin); (3) plague (Yersinia
pestis); (4) smallpox (Variola major); (5) tularemia (Francisella tularensis);
and (6) viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., filoviruses such as Ebola and
Marburg, and arenaviruses such as Lassa and Machupo).7 Category B
agents are considered to be the second highest priority because they: (1)
are moderately easy to disseminate; (2) result in moderate morbidity rates
and low mortality rates; and (3) require specific enhancements of CDC's
diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.8 Finally, Category
C agents have the third highest priority and represent emerging pathogens
that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of
their (1) availability; (2) ease of production and dissemination; and (3)
potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact.9
7. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Public Health
Emergency Preparedness, and Response, Biological Diseases/Agents Listing,
Category A, available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/Agentlist.asp#categorya-
diseases (last visited June 25, 2002).
8. Id. The following agents are currently included in Category B: "(1)
Brucellosis (Brucella species); (2) Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens; (3)
Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, Escherichia coli, Shigella); (4)
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei); (5) Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei); (6)
Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci); (7) Q fever (Coxiella burnetii); (8) Ricin toxin
from Ricinus communis (castor beans); (9) Staphylococcal enterotoxin B; (10)
Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii); (11) Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses, e.g.,
Venezuelan equine encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine
encephalitis); and (10) Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium
parvum)." Id.
9. Id. The following agents are currently included in Category C: "Emerging
infectious disease threats such as Nipah virus and hantavirus." Id.
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B. Agents at Issue and Treatments Available
1. Anthrax
Anthrax is caused by the spore-forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis (B.
Anthracis). B. anthracis occurs naturally in the soil, where it can remain
viable for many years. It is primarily a disease of animals (cattle, sheep
and other herbivores), and prior to the events of October 2001, the disease
was typically contracted by persons in frequent contact with animals
through work in agriculture, the wool trade or laboratory research.
Anthrax can be contracted through skin contact, ingestion or inhalation.
Inhalational anthrax is the most serious form of the disease, causing
respiratory failure and death in almost all untreated cases. Inhalational
anthrax is also least common in nature and had become extremely
uncommon in any form in the United States, until the intentional mailings
of anthrax spores caused an outbreak in the autumn of 2001 that resulted
in five deaths from the inhalational form of the disease.10
B. anthracis is considered one of the most likely biological
warfare agents because of the ability of B. anthracis spores to be
transmitted by the respiratory route, the high mortality of
inhalation anthrax, and the greater stability of B. anthracis
spores compared with other potential biological warfare agents.
Anthrax has been a focus of offensive and defensive biological
warfare research programs for approximately 60 years. The
World Health Organization estimated that 50 kg of B. anthracis
released upwind of a population center of 500,000 could result in
95,000 deaths and 125,000 hospitalizations."
A licensed vaccine for anthrax is currently marketed in the United
States, but it is not available for the general public. As discussed below,
there have been significant problems in the manufacturing of this vaccine
in addition to concerns about its safety. The vaccine is approved only to
prevent anthrax; its effectiveness when used for post-exposure prophylaxis
is currently being investigated. 2
10. See INST. OF MED., THE ANTHRAX VACCINE: IS IT SAFE? DOES IT WORK?
41-42 (Lois M. Joellenbeck, Lee L. Zwanginger, Jane S. Durch, Brian L. Strom,
eds., 2002) [hereinafter IOM Report]; See also Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the
United States Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1-3 (2000).
11. Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the United States: Recommendations of the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, 49 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. at 2.
12. Id. at 13.
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Recently, much has been learned about the effectiveness of antibiotic
treatment for inhalational anthrax following exposure. CDC currently
recommends treatment with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline. Both have been
approved by FDA for this purpose, although FDA notes that "no
controlled trials in humans have been performed to validate current
treatment recommendations for inhalational anthrax." 3 These antibiotics
are also considered first-line therapy for cutaneous anthrax.
2. Botulism
Botulism is caused by botulinum toxin, which is made by Clostridium
botulinum, a group of spore-forming bacteria commonly found in soil.
There are three main kinds of botulism: food borne botulism, caused by
consuming foods containing the botulism toxin; wound botulism, caused
by toxin produced from a wound infected with Clostridium botulinum; and
infant botulism, caused by consuming the spores of the botulinum bacteria
(e.g., in dirt), which then grow in the intestines and release the toxin. All
forms are potentially fatal. About 110 cases are reported each year in the
United States. 4
Botulinum toxin is the "the single most poisonous substance known." 5
It inhibits the neurotransmitter acetylcholine, causing muscle paralysis and
respiratory failure. This toxin poses a major bioweapons threat because
of its extreme potency and lethality, its ease of production, transport and
misuse and the potential need for prolonged intensive care in affected
persons.
No approved therapy exists for botulism. CDC holds an IND for an
antitoxin to botulinum toxin, which has been used as a vaccine in
13. Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax and Interim
Guidelines for Exposure Management and Antimicrobial Therapy, 50 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. at 916 (2001). Other antibiotics that may be used in
conjunction with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline include rifampin, vancomycin,
imipenem, chloramphenicol, penicillin and ampicillin, clindamycin and
clarithromycin; but "other than for penicillin, limited or no data exist regarding the
use of these agents in the treatment of inhalational B. anthracis infection." Id.
14. DIVISION OF MYCOTIC AND BACTERIAL DISEASES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Disease Information, Botulism, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/ botulism-g.htm (last visited June 25,
2002) [hereinafter CDC, BOTULISM INFORMATION].
15. CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, Botulinum Toxin,
available at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/agentbotox.html (last
visited June 25, 2002).
16. Id.
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occupational settings for workers in agricultural occupations and was
administered to some military personnel during the Gulf War.7 Patients
who experience respiratory failure and paralysis may require a ventilator
for several weeks, after which the paralysis may improve. Good
supportive care in a hospital is the mainstay of therapy for all forms of
botulism."
3. Plague
Plague is caused by Yersinia pestis (Y. pestis), a bacterium found in
rodents and their fleas in many areas around the world. 9 There are three
forms of plague: bubonic, septicemic and pneumonic." Bubonic plague is
transmitted from the bite of an infected flea or through broken skin. It is
not contagious.2 It can be fatal if left untreated. Septicemic plague occurs
when the bacteria invades the bloodstream, either as a complication of the
other two forms of plague or from another source. Pneumonic plague is
airborne and can be transmitted from person to person. Without early
treatment, pneumonic plague usually leads to respiratory failure, shock
and rapid death. 23
Bacteria introduced in an aerosolized form in a bioterrorist attack
would cause pneumonic plague. A 1970 World Health Organization
(WHO) assessment asserted that, in a worst-case scenario, a dissemination
of fifty kilograms of Y pestis in an aerosol cloud over a city of five million
might result in 150,000 cases of pneumonic plague, 80,000-100,000 of which
would require hospitalization, 36,000 of which would be expected to be
fatal.24
A U.S. licensed vaccine exists and, in a pre-exposure setting, appears to
have some efficacy in preventing or ameliorating bubonic disease.
17. RICHARD A. RETTIG, MILITARY USES OF DRUGS NOT YET APPROVED BY
THE FDA FOR CW/BW DEFENSE: LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR, 6-7 (1999).
18. CDC, BOTULISM INFORMATION, supra note 14.
19. See CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, Plague, available at
http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/agentplague.html (last visited
June 25, 2002); See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Public
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response, Facts About Pneumonic Plague,
available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/DocumentsApp/FactSheet/Plague/About.asp
(last visited June 25, 2002); Franz & Zajtchuk, supra note 2, at 150.
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Research and development efforts for a vaccine that protects against
inhalationally acquired pneumonic plague are ongoing. Several
antibiotics are effective against bubonic plague and, if administered soon




Smallpox is caused by the variola virus. It is transmitted from one
person to another through face-to-face exposure and could also be
transmitted through contact with contaminated clothing or sheets. Death
occurs in thirty percent of patients, and survivors may experience serious
scarring. Naturally occurring smallpox was declared eradicated by the
World Health Assembly in 1980.26 Smallpox represents one of the most
serious bioterrorist threats to the civilian population because it is highly
contagious and causes significant mortality, and treatment of smallpox is
currently limited to supportive therapy and antibiotics as required to treat
secondary bacterial infections. The only commercially approved smallpox
vaccine available in the United States is Wyeth Dryvax. The vaccine was
prepared using traditional methods, in which animals were infected with
vaccinia (cowpox) and the animal lymph was extracted and prepared.27
The facilities, expertise and infrastructure required for producing the virus
in this way are no longer available, as Wyeth Laboratories discontinued
distribution of the smallpox vaccine to civilians in 1983.28 The current U.S.
stockpile contains 15.4 million doses of the Dryvax vaccine, and
approximately sixty million doses of vaccine exist worldwide. 29 The
government has contracted with several companies to produce additional
25. Id.
26. CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, Smallpox, available at
http://www.hopkinsbiodefense.org/pages/agentslagentsmallpox.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2002).
27. CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, supra note 19.
28. Steven R. Rosenthal et al., Developing New Smallpox Vaccines, 7
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 920 (2001).
29. James W. LeDuc and John Becher, Current Status of Smallpox Vaccine
(letter to the editor), 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 593 (1999). In
November, 2002, FDA granted a license for the 15.4 million doses of the Dryvax
vaccine. Ceci Connolly, FDA Grants License for Smallpox Vaccine; Debate
Continues on How Much of U.S. Population Should Be Innoculated, WASH. POST.,
Nov. 2, 2002, at A13.
Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense
vaccines, but production is expected to take at least a year.30 The question
of whether, when and to whom the vaccine should be administered, has
been the subject of much debate and scientific uncertainty.3 No antiviral
agents have proven effective against smallpox, although research in this
area is active.32
5. Tularemia
Tularemia is caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis (F.
tularensis), which is widespread in animals, particularly rodents, rabbits,
and hares. Approximately 200 cases of tularemia in humans are reported
annually in the United States, mostly associated with the bites of infective
ticks and biting flies or with the handling of infected rodents, rabbits or
hares. It is not transmissible from person to person. It can cause a variety
of symptoms, including respiratory problems. At least forty percent of
persons with the lung and systemic forms of the disease may die if they are
not treated with the appropriate antibiotics.
F. tularensis is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known,
requiring inoculation or inhalation of as few as ten organisms to cause
disease. It is considered to be a dangerous potential biological weapon
because of its extreme infectivity, ease of dissemination and substantial
capacity to cause illness and death. A WHO expert committee reported in
30. In November 2001, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services awarded a
$428 million contract to the British-based Acambis PLC to produce 155 million
doses of the vaccine by Fall 2002. The government had previously contracted with
Acambis to produce fifty-four million doses. Liz Kowalczyk, A Deterrent to
Terrorism: HHS Awards Contract to Make Smallpox Vaccine, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 29, 2001, at C1. In 2000, CDC awarded a $343 million contract to Oravax, the
U.S. subsidiary of the British-based Peptide Therapeutics Group PLC, to develop
and stockpile forty million doses of smallpox vaccine, with deliveries scheduled to
start in 2004. Ronald Rosenberg, Oravax in $343M Contract to Develop Smallpox
Vaccine for Government, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 2000, at C1. Oravax, in turn,
has subcontracted with the Rockville, MD-based BioReliance to produce the
vaccine, and BioReliance also has contracts with the U.S. military to produce the
vaccine for military personnel. Julie Bell, BioReliance to Make Smallpox Vaccine
for Civilians: Rockville Company is Expected to Produce at Least 40 Million Doses,
BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 21, 2000, at 3C.
31. See e.g., The Many Variables of Smallpox Debate: Uncertainty Muddles
Decision on Vaccine, WASH. POST, June 6, 2002, at A3; Susan Okie, Studies Cite
Smallpox Vaccine Tradeoff" Mass Inoculation Might Kill Hundreds, Save
Thousands, WASH. POST, May 8, 2002, at A3.
32. James W. LeDuc & Peter B. Jahrling, Strengthening National Preparedness
for Smallpox: an Update, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155,156 (2001).
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1970 that if fifty kilograms of virulent F. tularensis was dispersed as an
aerosol over a metropolitan area with a population of five million, there
would an estimated 250,000 incapacitating casualties, including 19,000
deaths.33
CDC holds an IND for a vaccine against tularemia, which has been
used to protect laboratory personnel routinely working with the agent.
Given the short incubation period of the disease and the incomplete
protection of current vaccines against inhalational tularemia, vaccination
is not recommended for post-exposure prophylaxis. After exposure or
diagnosis, early antibiotic treatment is recommended. With appropriate
therapy, overall mortality is two percent.
6 Viral hemorrhagic fevers
The term viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) refers to a group of illnesses
that are caused by several distinct families of viruses. While some types of
hemorrhagic fever viruses can cause relatively mild illnesses, many of
these viruses cause severe life-threatening diseases.
Viruses associated with most VHFs naturally reside in an animal host
(e.g. rodents, arthropods). Ticks and mosquitoes serve as vectors for some
of the illnesses. However, the hosts of some viruses, such as Ebola and
Marburg, remain unknown.
In general, therapy is limited to supportive care, as neither prophylactic
nor post-exposure treatments exist for most VHFs.
III. BECOMING A DRUG OR VACCINE: THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
A. The Statutes
As a federal administrative agency, FDA is governed and constrained in
its actions by statutes enacted by Congress. Roughly a century ago,
Congress passed two statutes that have set the framework for FDA's
regulatory authority over drugs, medical devices and biological products,
including vaccines. These statutes are the Federal Food, Drug, and
33. CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, Tularemia, available at
http://www.hopkinsbiodefense.orglpages/agents/agenttularemia (last visted Nov.
12, 2002).
34. A licensed vaccine has greatly reduced the risk of yellow fever, and a
vaccine developed by the U.S. Army and currently under an IND for Argentine
hemorrhagic fever has effectively reduced the incidence of that disease. Franz &
Zajtchuk, supra note 2, at 159.
Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense
Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)35 and the Public Health Service Act (PHS
Act) 6 (originally the Biologics Control Act). This section will briefly
discuss the history of these statutes and the nature of the authority they
confer on FDA.
Congressional efforts to protect the public from unsafe medicines date
back to the turn of the 20th century. In the late 1800s and early 1900s,
Congress became increasingly concerned about the sale of dubious
"patent medicines" that were at best a waste of consumers' money and at
worst a serious threat to health. Even products containing opium,
morphine, heroin or cocaine were sold without restrictions. 3' This,
combined with serious concerns about the lack of food sanitation, led
Congress to pass the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act.38 The law prohibited
the interstate shipment of "adulterated" or "misbranded" food and drug
products and empowered FDA-then called the Bureau of Chemistry-to
go to court to stop the distribution of these products. " However, the law
was fairly weak in that it did not provide affirmative requirements for drug
safety, such as premarket testing, and did not require ingredient labels or
warnings. Moreover, the government could not prohibit product claims
unless they could be shown to be both false and fraudulent." Thus FDA
could take action only after a product was marketed, and only if FDA
35. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
36. Biologics Control Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902).
37. WALLACE F. JANSSEN, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, Part 1,
FDA CONSUMER (1981), available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/historyl.html-
#toc (last visited June 25, 2002).
38. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768
(1906).
39. Id. The Bureau of Chemistry, under the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
enforced the 1906 law until 1927 when it was reorganized. Law enforcement
functions were separated from agricultural research in order to emphasize and
secure better funding for the latter. The Food, Drug, and Insecticide
Administration was formed, to be renamed in 1931 as the Food and Drug
Administration. In 1940, to prevent recurring conflicts between producer and
consumer interests, FDA was transferred from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to the Federal Security Agency, which, in 1953, became the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare -- now the Department of Health
and Human Services. Id.
40. Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The
Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753,
1761 (1996) (discussing 1906 Act).
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could show actual knowledge by the seller that the claims it made were
false."
Since 1906, Congress has incrementally strengthened FDA's authority
over medicines. The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act created
the statutory entity of "new drug" and required any manufacturer of a new
drug to notify FDA prior to marketing.42 FDA was granted the authority
to review the safety of new drugs and to prohibit unsafe products from
being marketed.4 '3 FDA was also empowered to obtain injunctions against
manufacturers to inspect manufacturing facilities." FDA was also no
longer required to prove intentional falsity in order to remove a product
containing false claims.
The 1938 Act was nevertheless limited in that it put the burden on FDA
to affirmatively challenge a product to prevent its future marketing. The
Act also did not give the agency authority to oversee drug efficacy. The
1962 Amendments to the Act' introduced three fundamental changes to
the law and thereby launched the "modern U.S. drug regulatory system.4 7
First, the Amendments changed the new drug review system from one of
premarket notification, under which the maker of a new drug could begin
marketing after 180 days unless FDA challenged its safety, to a premarket
approval regime, under which the manufacturer could not begin marketing
until agency officials approved the product. 48 This change gave FDA "an
effective veto" over products for which it had concerns.4 9 Second, the
Amendments explicitly directed FDA to review new drugs for both safety
and effectiveness. Finally, the 1962 Amendments expanded FDA's
authority over the design and conduct of clinical trials of new drugs and
specified that the effectiveness of a drug must be demonstrated by
41. Id.
42. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-117, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938).
43. Merrill, supra note 40, at1761-1762.
44. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, Part 1lh 1938
- The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981,
available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/hitorla/html (last visited November 14,
2002).
45. Id.
46. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in
various sections of 21 U.S.C.).
47. Merrill, supra note 40, at 1764.
48. Id. at 1764-1765 (discussing the Drug Amendments of 1962(see supra note
46)).
49. Id. at 1765.
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"substantial evidence."50 The Amendments also gave FDA explicit
authority to establish standards under which experimental drugs may be
shipped to investigators who agree to conduct clinical trials." These two
grants of authority have made FDA the "ultimate arbiter of how clinical
trials should be designed."52
Since 1962, the statute has been amended more than twenty four times.
Significant changes occurred in 1976, when Congress granted FDA formal
jurisdiction over medical devices. 3 Another significant change occurred in
1992, when Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA) 4  The statute authorized FDA to assess fees from
manufacturers of drugs or biological products and directed FDA to use
these fees to hire personnel and carry out activities related to the review
and approval of product applications.5 The statute was reauthorized in
1997 for an additional five years as part of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) The user fee act was set
to expire in September 2002, but was reauthorized as part of bioterrorism
legislation enacted in June 2002."7
Biological products came to be regulated through a different historical
and statutory pathway. Four years before the enactment of the first law to
regulate food and drugs, Congress passed the Biologics Control Act of
1902, "an Act to regulate the sale of viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous
products."58 The Act was passed in direct response to the deaths of several
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
51. Merrill, supra note 40, at 1767 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)).
52. Id. at 1767.
53. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub.L. No. 98-21, 90 Stat. 539
(1976).
54. Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379(g)-379(h) (2000)).
55. Id. See also Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs:
Appropriate Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug
Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV. 93, 117-118 (1999).
56. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.
(2000)).
57. On June 12, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, 116 Stat 594 (2002). Title V of the Act, subtitled the Prescription Drug
User Fee Amendments of 2002, reauthorized PDUFA for five years.
58. Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-243, 32 Stat. 728 (July 1,
1902).
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children from diphtheria antitoxin that was contaminated with tetanus.5 9
More generally, the Act was intended to prevent loss of consumer
confidence in the emerging medical treatment called "serum therapy,"
which was being used successfully to treat diphtheria, smallpox and other
infectious diseases.
The 1902 Act established a board comprising the Surgeons General of
the Army and Navy and the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine
Hospital Service. The board was given authority to promulgate
regulations for licensing establishments engaged in the sale and
preparation of viruses, serums, toxins, antitoxins and analogous products
in interstate or foreign commerce. 60 The Act made it unlawful to transport
or sell products not prepared at a licensed establishment and not carrying
the name and license number of the manufacturer and a date beyond
which the contents could not be expected to yield "their specific results"--
in other words, beyond which they would no longer be potent.6 The Public
Health Service, the successor to the Marine Hospital Service, 62 was given
power to inspect the premises of any establishment manufacturing these
products and to issue sanctions for violations.63
Initially, tests of products and inspections of establishments were
carried out by scientists in the Hygienic Laboratory, Division of Pathology
and Bacteriology, which was under the direction of the Public Health
Service.6 The Ransdell Act of 1930 changed the name of the Hygienic
Laboratory to the National Institute of Health, and increased its
functions.6 In 1937, the biologics control program was assigned to the
59. In the fall of 1901, 13 children in St. Louis died after receiving diphtheria
antitoxin contaminated with tetanus. The serum had been obtained from a horse
infected with tetanus. During the same time period, nine children in New Jersey
died from tetanus thought to be associated with a smallpox vaccine, although it
was later determined that the vaccine was not the cause. Ramunas A. Kondratas,
Biologics Control Act of 1902, in THE EARLY YEARS OF FEDERAL FOOD AND
DRUG CONTROL, 14,16 (American Institute of the History of Pharmacy ed., 1982).
60. Id. at 16.
61. Biologics Control Act, supra note 58.
62. See Ramunas Kondratas, Images From the History of the Public Health
Service: A Photographic Exhibit (providing a photographic history of the U.S.
Public Health Service), at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/phs-history/
preface.html (last visited June 14, 2002).
63. Kondratas, supra note 59, at 16.
64. These scientists also carried out research, including original scientific work
to establish the American standard of potency for diphtheria antitoxin and other
vaccines. Kondratas, supra note 59, at 19.
65. Randsell Act, Pub. L. No. 71-251, 46 Stat. 379 (1930).
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newly established Division of Biologics Control. In 1944, the Division
was redesignated the Biologics Control Laboratory. In 1955, it was
detached from the Institute and expanded into a separate Division of
Biological Standards. In 1972, the organization was transferred from the
Institute to FDA jurisdiction and renamed the Bureau of Biologics.
During the 1980s, the drug and biologic divisions of FDA were briefly
joined, but were later severed again into two independent centers: the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) and the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).
The 1902 Act did not require a demonstration of product effectiveness.
66
Nor did the 1944 Public Health Service Act (PHS Act)67 which superseded
the 1902 Act and required manufacturers of biological products to
demonstrate that they were "safe, pure, and potent" as a condition of
licensing.6 Nevertheless, in practice, a demonstration of effectiveness has
historically been imposed. For example, in 1934, the National Institute of
Health promulgated a regulation formalizing this requirement, which
provided that "licenses for new products shall not be granted without
satisfactory evidence of therapeutic or prophylactic efficiency., 69 In
addition, in 1972 FDA explicitly stated in regulations that biological
products were also subject to the drug provisions of the FD&C Act ° This
understanding was formally codified in legislation under FDAMA.7" Thus,
in practice, the requirement of safety, purity and potency has come to be
understood as parallel to safety and effectiveness. The manner in which
FDA has chosen to ensure the safety and effectiveness of vaccines will be
discussed in subsection C below.
66. JOHN SWANN, Public Policy on Drug Efficacy, in THE INSIDE STORY OF
MEDICINES: A SYMPOSIUM, at 228 (Gregory J. Higby and Elaine C. Stroud, eds.,
1997).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1201(2000).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2000).
69. Swann, supra note 66, at 230.
70. See 37 Fed. Reg. 4004 (Feb. 25, 1972); See also 37 Fed. Reg. 16679 (Aug.
18, 1972); 38 Fed. Reg. 4319 (Feb. 13, 1973).
71. 21 U.S.C § 355 (2000) states:
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §301) applies to a
biological product subject to regulation under this section, except that a
product for which a license has been approved under subsection (a) shall
not be required to have an approved application under section 505 of such
act.
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B. The Process of Drug Approval
The FD&C Act prohibits the interstate distribution of any "new drug,"
i.e., any drug that is "not generally recognized, among experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness
of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.""' Section 505 of the
FD&C Act provides that a person seeking to market a new prescription
drug must file a new drug application (NDA) with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services,73 containing:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use; (B) a full list of the articles used as components
of such drug; (C) a full statement of the composition of such
drug; (D) a full description of the methods used in, and the
facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and
packing of such drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the
articles used as components thereof as the Secretary may
require; and (F) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used
for such drug.74
Information concerning a drug's safety must be derived from "adequate
tests by all methods reasonably applicable."75 The NDA also must contain
"substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof."76
The 1962 Amendments to the FD&C Act defined substantial evidence
as:
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could
fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug
will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under
72. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2000).
73. Although the text of the statute confers the authority on the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the authority has been delegated to the FDA
Commissioner. Delegations from the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 5.10 (2002).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).
75. Id. § 355(d).
76. Id.
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the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the labeling or proposed labeling thereof."
The text of the statute provides only a spare outline of the requirements
for drug approval. Through the development and issuance of regulations-
as well as more informal communications such as guidance documents-
FDA has put "flesh on the bones" of the statutory requirements to
provide additional specification and clarity regarding the types and
number of studies that are generally required as a condition of approval.
At the heart of FDA's requirements for drug approval is the clinical
trial. The "history of the effectiveness requirement in drug regulation is
inextricably linked to the advent of the randomized, controlled clinical
trial as the cornerstone of medical research., 78 The phrase "randomized
controlled clinical trial" (RCT) refers to studies in humans in which
participants (typically called "subjects") are randomly assigned to receive
the drug under investigation or a "control," i.e., another substance such as
a placebo or an approved drug for the same disease or condition. 9 RCT's
are typically also "double-blinded," meaning that neither the subject nor
the investigator knows to what group the subject has been assigned.,s
Within the scientific community, the RCT is generally considered to
provide an accurate, objective and scientific assessment of a drug's safety
and effectiveness." It is premised on the assumption that randomization
increases the comparability between the groups and decreases any
potential bias, thereby increasing the generalizability of the results to
patients outside the test groups.8 FDA's regulations therefore incorporate
the principles of RCTs, including randomization, control, double-blinding
and determination of minimum sample size.83
Before beginning to test a drug in humans, however, the "sponsor" of
that drug must submit an IND application to the agency.8 The IND is
77. Id.
78. Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the "Gold Standard" for New
Drug Approval? Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA Modernization Act





83. Id. at 129 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2002)); See also, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Guideline for the
Format and Content of the Clinical and Statistical Sections of New Drug
Applications (1988).
84. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2000).
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intended to protect human subjects by ensuring that unapproved products
are not administered absent some basis, gleaned through laboratory and
animal testing, upon which to assess the safety and potential usefulness of
the drug. Thus, the statute provides that the IND application must contain
information regarding the "design of the investigation and adequate
reports of basic information ... necessary to assess the safety of the drug
for use in clinical investigation" and "adequate information on the
chemistry and manufacturing of the drug, controls available for the drug,
and primary data tabulations from animal or human studies."8 5 FDA's
concerns regarding the pre-clinical studies are threefold: (1) animal studies
should be reasonable predictors of a drug's pharmacological activity; (2)
toxicity studies should be undertaken so as to reveal potential adverse
reactions in humans; and (3) laboratories undertaking non-clinical toxicity
testing should conform to good laboratory practices. 6
FDA regulations also mandate that the research that is the subject of
the IND be reviewed and approved by an institutional review board
(IRB).n FDA regulations set standards for IRBs reviewing clinical
investigations to support new product applications to FDA,,8 and
authorize FDA inspection of IRB records89 and the imposition of sanctions
for failure to comply with FDA regulations.90 In practice, however, FDA
has a "very limited ability to inspect and evaluate the work of IRBs," 9' and
leaves oversight responsibility largely to the IRB and its governing
institutions.'
85. 355 U.S.C. § 355(i)(2)(A), (B) (2000).
86. RICHARD A. MERRILL, FDA Regulation of Clinical Drug Trials, in THE
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY TRIALS: AN OVERVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC,
POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL CONCERNS 68 (Marc Hertzman & Douglas E. Feltner,
eds., 1997).
87. 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2002).
88. Id.
89. 21 C.F.R. § 56.115(c) (providing that the "Food and Drug Administration
may refuse to consider a clinical investigation in support of an application for a
research or marketing permit if the institution or the IRB that reviewed the
investigation refuses to allow an inspection under this section.").
90. 21 C.F.R. § 56.120-124. (Sanctions include disqualification of the IRB
and/or the institution at which the IRB operates).
91. Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the
Institutional Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 734
(2001). For example, although there are between 3,000 and 5,000 IRBs in the
United States, FDA is able to inspect only a few hundred each year.
92. Id. at 769. According to a recent Federal Register notice, FDA intends to
issue a proposed rule that would require all IRBs to register with the agency, in
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FDA considers the administration of an IND to a human being to
constitute research. Notwithstanding exceptions to be discussed later in
this paper, FDA, in general, authorizes the administration of an
investigational product only in the context of a clinical research trial.
Furthermore, because the subjects of the trial are being asked to
participate in an endeavor in which the prospect of direct therapeutic
benefit is uncertain and will likely entail risk-which in some cases may be
greater than standard treatment-the statute requires that the sponsor
obtain their consent.93
The manner in which consent must be obtained and documented is
specified in FDA regulations. 94 The statute provides for exceptions to the
consent requirement "where it is not feasible or it is contrary to the best
interests of such human beings." 95 As discussed below, the circumstances
under which exceptions to the consent requirement are legitimate became
a contentious issue following the Gulf War. Exception to consent remains
of significant concern where drugs to counter bioterrorism are at issue.
Unless FDA objects, clinical trials may begin thirty days after the IND
is received by FDA.96 Thereafter, they may proceed unless FDA places a
"clinical hold" on the IND. The statute authorizes this action upon a
determination that the drug involved "represents an unreasonable risk to
the safety of the persons who are the subjects of the clinical
investigation."9'
The clinical trial process is typically described as consisting of three pre-
approval phases. During Phase I, the drug is tested on a small number of
patients or healthy volunteers, usually 20 to 80, to study how the drug is
tolerated, metabolized and excreted. Phase I studies are not generally
designed to assess drug efficacy although they may provide some initial
evidence in this regard.98  Phase II studies are larger, generally comprising
order to facilitate FDA inspection of and communication with IRBs. The
proposed rule would require IRBs to provide FDA with the name of the
institution operating the IRB and the names of the senior officer of the institution
and IRB chair, along with their contact information, the range of active protocols
(small, medium, or large) involving FDA-regulated products reviewed in the
previous calendar year and a description of the types of FDA-regulated products
reviewed. 67 Fed. Reg. 33039, 33063 (May 13, 2002).
93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (2000).
94. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20, 50.25, 50.27 (2002).
95. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (2000).
96. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(2) (2000).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2000).
98. 53 Fed. Reg. 41516, 41518 (Oct. 21, 1988).
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of 50 to 200 patients, and it is the first time when both safety and
effectiveness are evaluated.99 Finally, Phase III trials may include between
200 and 1,000 patients or more, and are intended to confirm and expand
upon the safety and efficacy data obtained from the first two phases.' °°
These phases are not statutorily required, and they are by no means
absolute: indeed, some officials within FDA have tried to get away from
the "phase I, II, III" terminology because of concerns that it conveys an
unduly "mechanistic" description of the process.0 ' Nevertheless, the
terminology appears to remain the standard in the scientific and legal
literature, common parlance and FDA's own regulations.'
The statute does not mandate any particular number of clinical trials
that must be performed to satisfy the requirement for "substantial
evidence," but merely requires "adequate and well-controlled clinical
investigations."'0 ' Historically, based on the use of the plural
"investigations," FDA required at least two studies demonstrating
effectiveness. "' Critics of this two trial "gold standard" have argued that it
is inefficient and unnecessary in light of modern drug development
methods, and needlessly adds to the cost and time of drug development.' 5
FDA has, in recent years, signaled its willingness to consider approval
based on one pivotal phase III clinical trial under certain circumstances.
FDAMA explicitly authorized FDA to accept, as substantial evidence,
data from only one clinical trial upon a determination that "data from one
adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory
evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation) are sufficient to
establish effectiveness."'0'  The agency's 1998 guidance addressing
FDAMA's amendment to the law specifies the conditions under which
FDA may be willing to approve a drug or biological product based on
fewer than two effectiveness trials.' 7 These are when: (1) effectiveness
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For example, a 1997 Guidance Document suggested that a Phase II study
be referred to as "therapeutic exploratory" and a Phase III study be referred to as
"therapeutic confirmatory." Kulynych, supra note 78, at 143, (citing Food and
Drug Admin., International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on General
Considerations for Clinical Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. 66, 113 (Dec. 17, 1997)).
102. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2002).
103. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
104. Richard A. Merrill, supra note 86, at 84.
105. Kulynych, supra note 78, at 130.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
107. Id.
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can be adequately demonstrated using existing studies of another claim or
dose (e.g., approval for pediatric use on the basis of studies in adults); (2) a
controlled trial of a specific new use is supported by evidence from
adequately controlled trials from related uses, dosages or endpoints; and
(3) a single multicenter trial provides statistically convincing and clinically
meaningful evidence of effectiveness, supported by confirmatory
research."
It has always been possible for sponsors to meet informally with agency
officials before beginning the clinical trial to discuss study design and
methodological issues.'O° However, prior to 1997, there could be no
guarantee that, after the trials were conducted, an FDA reviewer would
not impose additional requirements. FDAMA provided a specific right to
meet with FDA officials to negotiate specifications for the effectiveness
trials and to obtain a written agreement as to these specifications. "' The
written agreement becomes part of the administrative record and may not
be augmented by FDA unless substantive scientific or safety issues arise."
In addition to ensuring safety and effectiveness, clinical trials also serve
a "weeding out" function. According to a recent study of approval success
rates for investigational drugs, the approval success rate for new chemical
entities for which INDs were filed between 1990 and 1992 (the latest time
period analyzed) was only 17.3 percent."2 Economic considerations (e.g.,
limited commercial market, insufficient return on investment) and
difficulty demonstrating efficacy were cited as reasons for abandoning
research activities on an NCE prior to marketing approval in a significant
percentage of cases."3
However, the high threshold of proof required for drug approval is not
without cost. According to a recent study by the Tufts Center for the
Study of Drug Development, the average prescription drug takes twelve
108. Kulynych, supra note 78, at 146, (citing FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for Human Drug and Biological
Products, 5 (May 1998)).
109. 21 C.F.R. § 10.65.
110. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 119, 111 Stat. 2317 (1997), codified at 21 U.S.C. §
355(b)(4)(C) (2000).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(4)(C). See also Kulynych, supra note 78, at 147.
112. Joseph A. DiMasi, Risks in new Drug Development: Approval Success
Rates for Investigational Drugs, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
297, 300 (2001). (Approval success rates ranged from 12.3 percent for self-
originated NCEs to 37.3 percent for acquired NCEs).
113. Id. at 304.
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years and costs $802 million to bring to market."' Particularly when a drug
is not expected to reap large profits, the costs of conducting clinical trials
may deter a manufacturer from pursuing clinical trials at all, or from
organizing the data and undertaking the administrative burden of
preparing and submitting an NDA. Drugs may therefore languish in the
IND phase for lack of a willing shepherd. This is the case with several
vaccines for agents on CDC's bioterrorism list-CDC holds an IND but
there is no financial incentive or regulatory pressure to bring them from
the investigational to the approved stage. While the Orphan Drug Act,
discussed later in this article, has helped provide incentives to produce
financially non-remunerative drugs, it has not yet been applied in the
bioterrorism context.
Finally, it should be noted that while a product is, from a regulatory
standpoint, "investigational" until the moment FDA approves the NDA,
what is known about the product's safety and effectiveness is by no means
static during the clinical trial process. There is no "magic moment" at
which a product changes from being considered completely ineffective and
unsafe to clearly safe and effective. Rather, there is a steady accretion of
knowledge concerning a product as clinical investigations proceed until
the product reaches the threshold set by FDA. As FDA has
acknowledged:
[v]irtually all drugs can be toxic to humans, and no drug is
completely free of risk. In approving a new drug for marketing,
FDA analyzes benefits and risks, and approves a drug if the
benefit outweighs the risks. In general, the more serious the
illness and the greater the effect of the drug on that illness, the
greater the acceptable risk from the drug. If products provide
meaningful therapeutic benefit over existing treatment for a life-
threatening disease, a greater risk may also be acceptable."'
Thus, there may be, and often are, points before enough data has been
accrued to satisfy FDA requirements or to warrant approval for the
general population at which there is nevertheless some basis to believe
that the product has therapeutic value. That FDA permits the
administration of investigational-status products to patients under certain
conditions - as will be discussed in section V-is recognition of the fact
that a product can simultaneously be investigational and potentially
therapeutic. This "gray zone" became a point of contention during the
Gulf War and is an impediment to the use of products to counter
114. Robert Pear, Research Cost For New Drugs Said to Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 2001, at C1.
115. 57 Fed. Reg. 13234, 13236 (Apr. 15, 1992).
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bioterrorism. As is proposed in section VII, the development of an interim
category of product approval, limited to use for military and homeland
defense and subject to stringent limitations and requirements, could
alleviate the concerns raised by the use of investigational products while
fostering wider availability of products to counter bioterrorism.
C. The Process of Vaccine Approval
A biological product, which includes a vaccine, is defined under the
PHS Act as:
a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood
component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous
product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any
other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of
human beings."6
The statute prohibits the distribution of any biological product unless
FDA has approved a "biologics license" for that product."7 The statute
states that an application "shall be approved" if the applicant: (1)
demonstrates that the biological product is "safe, pure, and potent"; (2)
shows that the facility in which the biological product is manufactured,
processed, packed or held "meets standards designed to assure that the
biological product continues to be safe, pure, and potent"; and (3)
consents to the inspection of the facility that is the subject of the
application."' FDA regulations prescribe the format and content of an
application for a biologics license (BLA),"9 which must include (1) data
from nonclinical laboratory and clinical studies demonstrating that the
manufactured product meets prescribed requirements of safety, purity and
potency; (2) a "full description of manufacturing methods;" and (3) data
establishing the stability of the product.
2 0
116. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2000).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a).
118. Id. § 262(a)(2)(B).
119. Prior to 1999, FDA required a biologics applicant to file two separate
applications, a "product license application" addressing the safety, purity and
potency of the biological product, and an "establishment license application"
addressing the manufacturing facility and methods. In 1999, FDA issued a final
rule eliminating the requirement for separate applications and replacing it with the
requirement for the submission of a "biologics license application" or BLA. The
BLA reduced the amount of information that had been required in the ELA, but
did not eliminate it. 64 Fed. Reg. 56441 (Oct. 20, 1999).
120. 21. C.F.R. § 601.2(a) (2002).
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The vaccine development and approval process shares many features
with that for drugs: animal and laboratory testing begins the research
process; clinical trials are almost always needed to establish safety and
effectiveness; and an IND is required in order to conduct clinical testing.
While the statutory standard under the PHS Act is "safety, purity, and
potency," as stated previously, FDA has traditionally interpreted it to
require the same amount and type of data as the safety and effectiveness
standard applied to drugs.
However, vaccine development has historically differed from drug
development, and consequently the manner of regulation has been
different as well. Prior to the advent of recombinant DNA technology,
vaccines were developed using either whole live attenuated (i.e.,
weakened) organisms, killed whole organisms, or inactivated toxins.'2'
Vaccines were originally prepared in live animals, a method prone to
contamination with bacteria and other adventitious agents, and the
antigenic and allergenic character of the accompanying animal protein
could potentially result in sensitization and allergic reactions.' 2  More
recently, animal cells grown in culture have been used, which reduce these
risks somewhat but do not eliminate them.
As a class, vaccines are distinct from drugs in three principal respects.
First, they are difficult to characterize, making it difficult to precisely
analyze their molecular composition.' 23 Second, as a consequence of the
difficulty of characterization, proper evaluation typically requires in vivo
testing (i.e., in a living animal or human system). Third, quality cannot be
assured from final tests on random samples but rather must be determined
from a combination of in-process tests, end-product tests and strict
controls of the entire manufacturing process.'24
These differences mean that the quality of a vaccine is closely linked to
the process for its manufacture, which must be rigorously controlled to
ensure that batches of vaccines produced on different occasions are of
reproducible and consistent quality. Quality is achieved through the
application of current good manufacturing practices (GMPs), which are
not static but rather evolve as scientific progress, technical development
and experience help to identify deficiencies and make improvements
121. Gregory A. Poland, Current Paradoxes and Changing Paradigms in
Vaccinology, 17 VACCINE 1605, 1608 (1999).
122. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 921.
123. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING. OFFICE, GAOF-NSIAD-99-148, MEDICAL
READINESS: SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF THE ANTHRAX VACCINE 2-3 (1999).
[hereinafter GAO REPORT: SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF THE ANTHRAX VACCINE].
124. Id.
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possible. GMPs apply not only to the manufacturing process but also to
the facilities and equipment in which the product is manufactured. In
short, FDA regulations and attitudes reflect a much greater concern with
the method of vaccine production than with drugs, based on the
underlying belief that the "process is the product."
Because regulation of vaccines is tied to advances in technology to an
even greater extent than for drugs, FDA regulation of vaccines has
become more stringent over time. As technology has permitted greater
precision and control in the production process, FDA has demanded
higher standards."' FDA has in recent years placed particular emphasis
on inspection of biologics facilities to review GMP compliance. In 1998,
CBER established Team Biologics, a group specifically tasked with
conducting post-approval inspections of biologics manufacturing
facilities,'26 in order to "focus resources on inspectional and compliance
issues in the biologics area. ' ' 17 Given this heightened emphasis on process,
125. A recent report by the RAND corporation describes the way in which the
science has changed over time:
[mlolecular biology has allowed scientists to clone and characterize the
molecules that determine virulence and confer immunogenicity and has
thus allowed the development of new vaccine strategies. Advances in cell
biology have led to a greater understanding of cellular and molecular
interactions after infection. The Institute of Medicine cited eight major
areas of increased scientific understanding over the past fifteen years: the
role of helper T cells in antibody and cell-mediated immunity; mucosal
immune system organization; molecular aspects of virulence; design of
recombinant protein vaccines; novel vaccine delivery systems;
development of novel adjuvants; and vaccine against autoimmune
diseases. These scientific advances have led to advanced vaccine target
selection, increased ability to characterize vaccines more accurately,
greater purity of vaccines, and improved safety and efficacy profiles.
Richard A. Rettig, Jennifer Brower, and Orlie Yaniv, Drugs & Biologics:
Development & Acquisition for CW/BW Defense, at 25 (unpublished draft report,
on file with author).
126. Team Biologics is a partnership between FDA's Office of Regulatory
Affairs and CBER. The goal of Team Biologics is to "ensure the quality and
safety of biological products and quickly resolve inconsistencies and bring products
into compliance." It is designed to "promote uniformity between CBER and the
field and among FDA field components associated with inspections, policy
implementation, and current good manufacturing practice interpretation." 63 Fed.
Reg. 36699, 36699-36700 (July 7, 1998).
127. CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN., Team Biologics, A Plan For Reinventing FDA's Ability to Optimize
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vaccines approved in past decades would face significantly more difficult
requirements if approval were sought today. As will be seen below in the
discussion of the anthrax vaccine, this has been a problem for "legacy"
vaccines developed through traditional methods.1 8
Finally, vaccines differ from drugs in another crucial respect. The vast
majority of drugs are developed to cure or ameliorate existing diseases or
conditions. While in recent years more emphasis has been placed on
prevention (e.g., lower cholesterol, maintain bone density), even these
drugs target known correlates of future disease in the context of diseases
whose statistical likelihood is fairly predictable. Thus, whereas the risks of
a drug are balanced against the risks of the disease it is treating or
preventing, the risks of a vaccine must be weighed against the risk of
exposure and risk of harm from the disease in the event exposure occurs.
Since vaccines are almost always intended for administration to healthy
people, and the risk of exposure can never be predicted with complete
certainty, particularly when the risk stems from feared bioterrorist events,
it may be much more difficult to decide when exposure to the risk of
adverse reactions from the vaccine is warranted. Such decisions can be
expected to be fraught with disagreement and controversy.
D. Drugs and Vaccines to Counter Bioterrorism: FDA's Animal
Efficacy Rule
Demonstrating the effectiveness of drugs and vaccines to counter
bioterrorism is more challenging than for many other products because of
ethical constraints on the conduct of clinical trials. The best test of the
effectiveness of a vaccine to counter a biological agent would be to
vaccinate individuals and then expose them to the agent. Failure to
contract the disease would be strong evidence of the vaccine's
effectiveness. Similarly, recovery from the disease following
administration of an investigational drug would be convincing evidence of
the drug's effectiveness. Neither of these trial designs would, however, be
ethical, as they would require the administration of a potentially lethal
substance to healthy human volunteers in the absence of any proven
treatment that could be administered if the vaccine or drug being tested
129were ineffective.
Compliance of Regulated Biologics Industries, available at http://www.fda.gov/
cber/genadmin/teambio.htm (last visited June 25, 2002).
128. IOM Report, supra note 10, at 182.
129. Id. at 61.
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In 1999, FDA issued a proposed rule addressing this problem.' 30 The
proposed rule stated FDA's conclusion that requiring human efficacy
studies "has the effect of preventing the development and availability" of
drug and biological products "to reduce or prevent serious or life-
threatening toxicity resulting from exposure to lethal or permanently
disabling toxic biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear substances."'
31
Thus, to promote the availability of such products, FDA proposed to
eliminate the requirement for efficacy data derived from human studies
and to instead grant marketing approval for a new drug or biological
product on the basis of adequate and well-controlled animal trials under
certain conditions.
On May 31, 2002, nearly three years after it first proposed the rule,
FDA issued a final rule authorizing FDA to base a determination of
effectiveness for drugs and biological products used to reduce or prevent
the toxicity of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances
solely on data derived from animal studies.132 The rule is intended to
address those situations in which "adequate and well-controlled efficacy
studies cannot be ethically conducted because the studies would involve
administering a potentially lethal or permanently disabling toxic substance
or organism to healthy human volunteers" and field trials prior to
approval are not feasible. 33 FDA specified four criteria that must be met
in order to base a determination of effectiveness on animal studies.'3 In
130. 64 Fed. Reg. 53960 (Oct. 5, 1999).
131. Id. at 53963.
132. 67 Fed. Reg. 37988 (May 31, 2002). Interestingly, the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002) which was signed into law on June 12, 2002, imposed
a 90-day deadline on FDA to complete the rulemaking process for the animal
efficacy rule. It is unclear whether awareness of this impending deadline spurred
FDA's completion of the rulemaking process.
133. Id. at 37989.
134. Id. at 37995-37997 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314.610(1)-(4),
601.91a(1)-(4)(2002)) ("(1) There is a reasonably well-understood
pathophysiological mechanism for the toxicity of the chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear substance and its amelioration or prevention by the
product; (2) The effect is demonstrated in more than one animal species expected
to react with a response predictive for humans, unless the effect is demonstrated
in a single animal species that represents a single well-characterized animal model
(meaning the model has been adequately evaluated for its responsiveness) for
predicting the response in humans; (3) The animal study endpoint is clearly related
to the desired benefit in humans, which is generally the enhancement of survival or
prevention of major morbidity; and (4) The data or information on the
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addition, approval pursuant to the new rule is subject to three
requirements. First, the manufacturer must conduct postmarketing safety
and clinical benefit studies, to the extent such studies are feasible and
ethical, i.e., in the event of an exposure or possible exposure to a lethal or
potentially disabling substance. Applications for approval must include
a plan for postmarketing studies. Second, FDA approval will be
conditioned on "such postmarketing restrictions as are needed to ensure
safe use of the drug product.', 3 6 Finally, patient labeling for the products
must state that the drug's approval was based on efficacy studies
conducted in animals only, in addition to providing information typically
included in patient labeling, such as foreseeable risks, potential adverse
reactions and contraindications.'37 Notably, the rule does not impose an
absolute requirement that labeling be provided to patients prior to the
administration of the product, but states that this must be done "if
possible."'38
The rule became effective as of July 1, 2002. It is therefore too soon to
determine whether it will result in greater availability of products to
counter biological attacks. This will depend in large measure on the
manner in which it is applied by FDA to particular products (e.g., the
number of animal species from which FDA requires data, the length of
time for which tests must be conducted).'39 Similarly uncertain is the
degree to which pharmaceutical companies will choose to take advantage
of the new rule. As has been noted, drugs to counter bioterrorism have
pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of the product or other relevant data or
information in animals and humans is sufficiently well-understood to allow
selection of an effective dose in humans, and it is therefore reasonable to expect
the effectiveness of the product in animals to be a reliable indicator of its
effectiveness in humans.").
135. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314.610(b)(1), 601.91(b)(1)).
136. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314.610(b)(2), 601.91(b)(2)). (These
conditions could include restricting distribution to specially trained personnel,
requiring particular medical procedures to be performed, such as medical
followup, and requiring compliance with specified recordkeeping obligations).
137. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314.610(b)(3), 601.91(b)(3)).
138. Id.
139. FDA estimates that the rule will be applied infrequently, probably once
every three years. 64 Fed. Reg. at 37994. Janet Woodcock, the Director of FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, stated her view that the rule is
"narrowly drawn," that it will usually require two or more animal tests, and that it
could be invoked only when all other FDA testing standards are inappropriate.
Marc Kaufman, FDA Acts To Speed Bioterror Medicines, WASH. POST, May 31,
2002, at Al.
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historically constituted a "niche" market with limited profits,' 40 and the
extent to which 9/11 and its aftermath have caused substantive alterations
in this market remains to be seen. It should also be noted that the ability
to use animal data exclusively applies only to the effectiveness
requirement; safety must still be demonstrated using human subjects. It is
unclear how extensive FDA's safety testing requirements will be for these
products, and therefore how long product approval will require.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the new rule is a necessary-but likely
insufficient-step toward increasing the availability of products to counter
bioterrorism.
IV. HISTORICAL REASONS FOR CONCERN
The purpose of this paper is to examine FDA's role in regulating
products to counter biological attacks and to suggest changes that could
facilitate the development and approval of new products for this purpose.
The topic under consideration necessarily presupposes, however, that
there are reasons for concern regarding FDA's influence on the
availability of products and that things "could be better" than they are, for
reasons both internal and external to FDA. This section examines the
bases for such concerns, some of which are related to specific events and
others that relate to the perceived "culture" of FDA.
A. DOD and FDA: The Troubling Gulf War Legacy
1. Background
In Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military faced the frightening
possibility that Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons
against U.S. troops; indeed he was known to have used chemical agents
against his own population, and available intelligence indicated he might
also have biological weapons capability. The chemical threats of
particular concern were nerve agents, i.e., chemicals that inhibit the
enzyme acetylcholinesterase, a key regulator of cholinergic
neurotransmission. Agents in this class include the gases sarin, soman and
tabun, and the liquid VX.'4' Biological threats viewed most significant
140. Andrew Pollack and William J. Broad, Traces of Terror: Bioterrorism;
Antiterror Drugs Get Test Shortcut, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002, at Al.
141. Rettig, supra note 17, at 2.
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were the microorganism Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and botulinum toxin,
produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum.2
Thus, the military sought to protect its personnel through any available
means, including both physical (e.g., protective equipment), and
chemical/biological (e.g., drugs and vaccines). However, while there
existed a FDA-licensed vaccine to protect against anthrax exposure, no
agents had been approved by FDA specifically for the purpose of
preventing harms from exposure to nerve agents or botulinum toxin. The
military therefore sought to administer investigational products-i.e.,
products for which an IND had been filed with FDA but for which no
NDA or BLA had yet been issued-to troops facing potential exposure.
Specifically, the military sought to administer the drug pyridostigmine
bromide (PB) as a pre-treatment against nerve agent exposure, and
botulinum toxin (BT) vaccine to protect against botulism. PB is approved
by FDA for treatment of myasthenia gravis and for use in reversing some
effects of certain anesthetics. DOD had filed an IND for PB as a
pretreatment to nerve agent exposure in 1984.143 BT vaccine, which had
been used for over a decade by individuals in certain agricultural
occupations at risk for botulism, was the subject of an IND held by the
CDC.
To accomplish its objectives, DOD's Assistant Secretary for Health
Affairs submitted a letter to FDA in which it requested the authority to
administer products under an IND to troops. The letter detailed the
Department's belief that "the best preventive or therapeutic treatment
calls for the use of products now under investigational new drug (IND)
protocols of the FDA."'" Further, DOD requested that FDA provide a
142. Id.
143. Rettig, supra note 17, at 6.
144. 55 Fed. Reg. 52814 (Dec. 21, 1990). The letter further stated, in part:
[tihese are not exotic new drugs; these drugs have well-established uses
(although in contexts somewhat different from our requirements) and are
believed by medical personnel in both DOD and FDA to be safe. For
example, one product consists of a very commonly used drug packaged in
a special intramuscular injector to make it readily useable by soldiers on
the battlefield. Another example involves a vaccine long recognized by
the Centers for Disease Control as the primary preventive treatment
available for a particular disease, but the relative infrequency of its use
has slowed the accumulation of sufficient immunogenicity data to yet
support full licensing of the product. Still another example involves a drug
in common use at a particular dosage level, but to preserve alertness of
the soldiers, we prefer a lower-dosage tablet, which is not an FDA
approved product. FDA personnel have been extremely cooperative and
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mechanism to waive the requirement of informed consent "in cases in
which it is established that military combat exigencies make that
necessary." 4 '
The considerations underlying DOD's decision to request FDA
authorization have never been publicly articulated. It is worth a few
moments reflection on the usually unquestioned assumption that DOD
was legally required to seek FDA's approval before administering these
products to troops facing combat. Notwithstanding a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between FDA and DOD concerning clinical testing
of investigational products by the military,'46 DOD could have taken the
supportive in reviewing our proposed protocols for these products,
quickly providing favorable responses to all of our submissions to date.
Id.
145. Id. at 52815. The letter further articulated the rationale justifying DOD's
request:
FDA assistance is also needed on the issue of informed consent. Under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the general rule is that,
regardless of the character of the medical evidence, any use of an IND,
whether primarily for investigational purposes or primarily for treatment
purposes, must be preceded by obtaining informed consent from the
patient. The statute authorizes exceptions, however, when the medical
professionals administering the product "deem it not feasible" to obtain
informed consent.
Our planning for Desert Shield contingencies has convinced us that
another circumstance should be recognized in the FDA regulation in
which it would be consistent with the statute and ethically appropriate for
medical professionals to "deem it not feasible" to obtain informed
consent of the patient -- that circumstance being the existence of military
combat exigencies, coupled with a determination that the use of the
product is in the best interest of the individual. By the term "military
combat exigencies", we mean military combat (actual or threatened)
circumstances in which the health of the individual, the safety of other
personnel and the accomplishment of the military mission require that a
particular treatment be provided to a specified group of military
personnel, without regard to what might be any individual's personal
preference for no treatment or for some alternative treatment.
Id. at 52814-52815.
146. 52 Fed. Reg. 33472, 33473 (Sept. 3, 1987) provides:
The FDA and the DOD agree that:
A. Clinical testing of investigational drugs, biologics, or medical devices
under programs sponsored by the DOD and conducted either by the
DOD within its own research facilities, or for the DOD by a contractor or
grantee will follow the provisions of 21 CFR Part 312 or 21 CFR Part 812
governing the investigational use of new drugs and medical devices in
20021
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position that neither FDA's governing statutes nor the MOU were
intended to apply to the administration of unapproved products for
therapeutic purposes under conditions of imminent combat. For example,
DOD could have, if challenged, asserted that distribution of drugs under
these circumstances does not constitute distribution in "interstate
commerce" within the meaning of the FD&C Act. Furthermore, a court
might have determined that the decision to administer products,
considered investigational by FDA for the purpose of force protection,
was within the sole discretion of the military and therefore
nonjusticiable.'47
human beings, and FDA's informed consent and Institutional Review
Board regulations (21 CFR Part 50 and 21 CFR Part 56).
B. They will continue to cooperate in meeting the requirements of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and its implementing regulations
without jeopardizing the mission of the DOD. To accomplish this goal,
they agree that an expeditious review of special DOD requirements to
meet national defense considerations will be carried out by FDA. This
review would consist of an FDA review of available data on a drug,
biological, or device under IND or IDE to determine if stockpiling for
future use, or use in an expanded military population is appropriate.
When necessary, special reporting requirements would also be established
by FDA.
C. It is the general policy of the DOD not to classify medical research and
development. However, should it become necessary to classify for reasons
of national security the clinical testing of a drug, biologic, or medical
device that would normally fall under the provisions of 21 CFR Parts 312
or 812, these studies will be handled under the special provisions of this
MOU. The DOD will be solely responsible for determining the security
classification of such research projects. If classified studies are required
DOD will submit a classified IND or IDE application to be reviewed by
appropriate FDA personnel who hold the required security clearances. It
will be the responsibility of the FDA to maintain an appropriate cadre of
personnel who have security clearances. In the event that a request is
made under the Freedom of Information Act for records concerning the
research DOD has classified, FDA will refer such requests to DOD for
processing and response under DOD regulations.
147. Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1991), affd 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (rejecting a service member's challenge to Interim Rule 50.23(d) on the
basis that the military's decision to administer unapproved drugs to troops was
"precisely the type of military decision that courts have refused to second-guess"
Id. at 15. While the appellate court reversed the lower court's finding on
reviewability because it construed the petitioners' challenge as being to FDA, and
not DOD's, authority, it did not refute the lower court's assertion that the
underlying decision whether or not to administer the drugs was within the sole
discretion of the military.).
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The point of this thought experiment is not to suggest that DOD's
decision to involve FDA was mistaken. Indeed, putting aside the question
of uncertain applicability of FDA regulations and the MOU to combat
conditions, there are several policy justifications that could be proffered to
support at least some degree of dialogue between DOD and FDA
concerning the administration of unapproved products under these
circumstances. At the very least, recent events have demonstrated that
drugs whose initial foreseeable use is uniquely military may rapidly be
needed to protect at least some sectors of the civilian population. Thus,
there is merit to involving FDA at an early stage of product development.
Nevertheless, it is at the same time true that DOD's decision to engage
FDA has led to a complex and delicate dance for which both partners
were arguably ill-prepared and in which both, at least initially, stumbled.
Although it might have taken another position, DOD acceded to FDA's
jurisdiction and requested the authority to administer IND drugs to
military personnel. Such a request was not unprecedented; indeed, as will
be discussed in greater detail in section V, FDA had expanded and
formalized the circumstances under which investigational products could
be administered outside the context of a research protocol. What was
without precedent, however, was DOD's request that FDA waive the
requirement for informed consent that some would argue is a non-
waivable prerequisite for clinical use of unapproved products. While
FDA's informed consent regulations contain exceptions to the general
requirement for informed consent in cases where consent was "infeasible,"
this exception had previously been narrowly limited to cases of clear
incapacity under emergent conditions.' FDA ultimately acceded to
DOD's interpretation of "infeasibility" that encompassed competent
military personnel. As set forth in the waiver request submitted to FDA
by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), DOD believed
148. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 1990 (providing that "no investigator may involve a
human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations unless the
investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or
the subject's legally authorized representative." Prior to the Interim Rule, section
50.23(a) provided that consent "shall be deemed feasible" unless both the
investigator and a non-participating physician certify in writing that: "(1) The
human subject is confronted by a life-threatening situation necessitating the use of
the test article. (2) Informed consent cannot be obtained from the subject because
of an inability to communicate with, or obtain legally effective consent from, the
subject. (3) Time is not sufficient to obtain consent from the subject's legal
representative. (4) There is available no alternative method of approved or
generally recognized therapy that provides equal or greater likelihood of saving
the life of the subject.").
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that refusal by individual military personnel of therapies that, while from a
regulatory perspective investigational, nevertheless constituted the best
available treatment, would constitute an unacceptable threat to other
personnel and to combat objectives.49 Furthermore, notwithstanding the
investigational status of the products, DOD viewed their administration as
therapeutic, that is, for the purpose of protecting troops from the chemical
and biological threats they could potentially encounter. Thus, DOD
concluded that their use did not constitute "research involving a human
being as an experimental subject" within the meaning of DOD regulations
governing human subjects research.'9 And, unlike civilians, the consent of
149. The Assistant Secretary's request stated:
[iun all peacetime applications, we believe strongly in informed consent
and its ethical foundations. In peacetime applications, we readily agree to
tell military personnel, as provided in FDA's regulations, that research is
involved, that there may be risks or discomforts, that participation is
voluntary and that refusal to participate will involve no penalty. But
military combat is different. If a soldier's life will be endangered by nerve
gas, for example, it is not acceptable from a military standpoint to defer to
whatever might be the soldier's personal preference concerning a
preventive or therapeutic treatment that might save his life, avoid
endangerment of the other personnel in his unit and accomplish the
combat mission. Based on unalterable requirements of the military field
commander, it is not an option to excuse a non-consenting soldier from
the military mission, nor would it be defensible militarily -- or ethically --
to send the soldier unprotected into danger.
55 Fed. Reg. 52814, 52815 (Dec. 21, 1990) (regulations repealed).
150. At the time of the Gulf War, DOD's governing statute, 10 U.S.C. § 980,
provided that funds appropriated to the Department of Defense could not be used
for research involving a human being as an experimental subject unless the
informed consent of the subject was obtained in advance, or, in the case of
"research intended to be beneficial to the subject," the "informed consent of the
subject or a legal representative of the subject" was obtained in advance. When
faced with the issue of administering IND drugs to military personnel, Robert
Gilliat, the Assistant General Counsel of DOD concluded in a memorandum that
"the proposed uses of the drugs in question are, in fact, primarily treatment uses,
not uses primarily for investigational or research purposes." Additionally, the
memorandum stated:
[i]n connection with the potential need in Operation Desert Shield for
certain treatment uses of the several drugs classified as INDs, it is clear
that very unusual circumstances are present. The drugs have all
progressed through FDA's IND process sufficiently to establish a high
level of confidence on the part of the DOD medical community; the
potential effects of the chemical and biological weapons widely reported
as available to the Iraqi military are deadly; and the proposed uses, if
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military personnel is not required to administer standard medical
treatments.' 5'
In December 1990, FDA issued Interim Rule 50.23(d) granting the
Assistant Secretary's request, but simultaneously imposed several
conditions.1 12  First, any request for waiver was "limited to a specific
military operation or the immediate threat of combat,"'5 3 and time-limited
to twelve months, and any determination that obtaining consent was not
feasible was similarly limited. Second, requests were required to include
written justification supporting the conclusions of the military physician
and investigator identified in the IND that:
a military combat emergency exists because of special military
combat (actual or threatened) circumstances in which, in order
to facilitate the accomplishment of the military mission,
preservation of the health of the individual and the safety of
other personnel require that a particular treatment be provided
to a specified group of military personnel, without regard to
what might be any individual's personal preference for no
treatment or some alternative treatment.'54
Third, the requests were required to include a statement that an IRB
had reviewed and approved the use of the investigational product without
consent.'55 The FDA Commissioner could grant the request "only when
withholding treatment would be contrary to the best interests of military
personnel and there is no available satisfactory alternative therapy."'5 6 In
making the determination, the Commissioner would consider (1) the
approved by the FDA, will reflect the best scientific and medical
judgment of the U.S. Government.
Rettig, supra note 17, at 21, quoting Robert L. Gilliat, Memorandum for the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), "Applicability of Human Subject
Research Restrictions to Potential Medical Treatments in Connection with
Operation Desert Shield," September 14, 1990.
In 2001, Congress amended 10 U.S.C. § 980 to include a new subsection (b), which
provides: "The Secretary of Defense may waive the prohibition in this section with
respect to a specific research project to advance the development of a medical
product necessary to the armed forces if the research project may directly benefit
the subject and is carried out in accordance with all other applicable laws." 10
U.S.C. § 980(b) (2000).
151. Army Regulation 600-20, 5-4 (2002).
152. 55 Fed. Reg. 52814, 52817 (Dec. 21, 1990)(regulations repealed).
153. Id.
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extent and strength of the evidence of the safety and effectiveness of the
investigational drug for the intended use; (2) the context of the drug's
administration, e.g., battlefield, hospital setting or self-administration; (3)
the nature of the disease or condition for which the preventive or
therapeutic treatment was intended; and (4) the nature of the information
to be provided to the recipients of the drug concerning the potential
benefits and risks of taking or not taking the drug.157
FDA also exempted DOD from many of the record-keeping
requirements usually mandated for administration of IND products.'5
DOD contended that detailed record keeping regarding what products
were administered, when, and to whom, were not possible under
conditions of battle. ' FDA agreed to waive or reduce some of the
record-keeping requirements, and DOD appears to have agreed, before
the fact, to conduct some degree of record keeping. Notwithstanding prior
agreements, however, DOD was later faulted for its inadequate record
keeping, which impeded the ability to study the possible health-effects
experienced by veterans.' 6°
DOD also requested a waiver from the labeling requirements for IND
products. Such products ordinarily must contain language stating
"Caution: New Drug-Limited by Federal (or United States) law to
investigational use.' 6' DOD argued that this language would undermine
soldiers' confidence in the product and even encourage non-use.'6 2 FDA
therefore permitted different labeling that stated "FOR MILITARY USE
AND EVALUATION.'
63
Following the issuance of the Interim Rule, DOD submitted, and FDA
granted, specific waiver requests for PB and BT.'6
2. Analysis
FDA's waiver of the informed consent requirement generated
significant controversy as well as criticism of the agency, and ultimately led
to changes in military policy that reverberate to this day. Although the
157. Id.
158. 55 Fed. Reg. 52814, 52816 (Dec. 21, 1990)(regulations repealed).
159. Rettig, supra note 17, at 17-19.
160. Rettig, supra note 17, at 36 (discussing Presidential Advisory Committee
report).
161. 21 C.F.R. § 312.6 (1991).
162. Rettig, supra note 17, at 17.
163. 64 Fed. Reg. at 54184 (Oct. 5, 1999)(regulations repealed).
164. Rettig, supra note 17, at 26-28.
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decision was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a
proper exercise of the agency's authority,'6" many viewed FDA as having
been complicit in serious ethical violations perpetrated by DOD against its
personnel. Criticism was fueled, in part, by the widespread reports by
veterans of an unexplained constellation of debilitating symptoms-what
has come to be known as Gulf War Syndrome. While no single definitive
cause of Gulf War Syndrome has been identified, PB has been identified
as a possible contributor to the development of at least some of the
illnesses reported by Gulf War veterans?6
Most critics have reflexively taken the position that the lack of informed
consent was a clear violation of the Nuremberg Code. 167 This Code, which
was promulgated by the tribunal that presided over the trial of the Nazi
doctors at Nuremberg in 1947, specifies ten principles that should govern
all experiments conducted with human research subjects."" The first of
these principles - and the one that historically has received the most
attention - provides that the "consent of the human subject is absolutely




165. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
166. See e.g., BEATRICE ALEXANDRA GOLOMB, A REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC
LITERATURE AS IT PERTAINS TO GULF WAR ILLNESSES VOLUME II:
PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE, 1999.
167. See George J. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent
Requirement for Using Investigational Drugs and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AM. J. L.
AND MED. 245 (1998); See also Claire Alida Milner, Gulf War Guinea Pigs: Is
Informed Consent Optional During War?, 13 J. CONTEMP. H. L. & POL'Y 199
(1996); Robyn Pforr Ryan, Should Combat Troops Be Given the Option of
Refusing Investigational Drug Treatment?, 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 377 (1997); Suzanne
B. Seftel, Justiciability: Waiving for the Flag: Should Informed Consent Rules Apply
in the Context of Military Emergencies?, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1387 (1992).
168. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, VOL. 2, 181-182 (1949)
[herinafter NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS].
169. Id. The complete text of the Nuremberg Code provides:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and
should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
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While it is often assumed that the Nuremberg Code is universal in its
scope and application, in reality the drafters focused narrowly on what is
generally termed as "nontherapeutic" research- that species of research
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation
in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be
delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good
of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not
random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the
disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will
justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason to
believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those
experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the
experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to
protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of
injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through
all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the
experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or
mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be
impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill and
careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is
likely to result in injury, disability or death to the experimental subject.
170. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 155 (1986).
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that is without potential therapeutic value or purpose for the particular
subjects of the research.'7' Such research is ethically suspect because it
uses the individual solely as a means to an end completely unrelated to
that person's well being.' Specifically, non-therapeutic research seeks to
use an individual's physical and/or mental capacities solely for purposes
not intended or expected to be directly beneficial to that person. While
such information may ultimately lead to the development of new
therapies, the immediate endpoint of interest is knowledge. Consent is
therefore intended to ensure that the subject is a knowing and voluntary
participant in this quest for knowledge, has a full appreciation of the risks
involved, as well as the fact that there is no expectation of personal
benefit.
The other provisions of the Nuremberg Code seek to ensure that the
research itself stays within acceptable bounds, i.e., that the research for
which consent is being sought is within ethical limits, recognizing that
people may, through coercion, ignorance or other factors, agree to
participate in research that is inherently morally objectionable.'73
That the drafters of the Nuremberg Code were directed to
nontherapeutic research is logical, given that the Nazi experiments were
"willfully harmful," using unwilling captive research subjects to explore
physiological effects of, for example, ingesting poisons, infection with
various diseases and intravenous injections with ice water--interventions
that were clearly not intended to confer any benefit on the subjects."' This
limited scope of the Nuremberg Code may explain, in part, why many
physicians and investigators in the United States after World War I did
not view the Code as applicable to their clinical treatment and research
activities. They perceived themselves as focused on patient care and on
developing interventions with the potential to alleviate their patients'
suffering. 5 While this type of research, usually termed "therapeutic" or
171. Id. at 156.
172. In developing a moral paradigm for the duties owed to research subjects,
Western bioethical thought has relied in part on the writings of the 18th century
German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant expressed the view that autonomous
individuals possess intrinsic value that is independent of external circumstances
that confer value. Therefore, autonomous persons are "ends in themselves,
determining their own destiny, and are not to be treated merely as means to the
ends of others." Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 170, at 8.
173. NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 168.
174. Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 170, at 153.
175. Postwar Professional Standards and Practices for Human Experiments, in
FINAL REPORT, ADVISORY COMMIITEE ON HUMAN RADIATION 130-170 (1995).
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"clinical", also raises ethical concerns, it does so in a quite different
context. The Declaration of Helsinki, issued in 1964 by the World Medical
Association, explicitly distinguished nontherapeutic from therapeutic
research, and sought to develop ethical principles to govern these distinct
settings.116 Like the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki made
consent a "central requirement of ethical research." Unlike the
Nuremberg Code, however, the Helsinki Declaration recognizes that, in
the context of therapeutic research, it may be ethically permissible for the
physician conducting the clinical investigation to refrain from obtaining
informed consent.
Critics of FDA's grant of a waiver to DOD appear to have taken the
position that the administration of a drug classified by FDA as
investigational is categorically non-therapeutic research, and that the
failure to obtain consent is therefore a per se violation of the Nuremberg
Code. As George Annas, one of the Interim Rule's most prominent
critics, has stated:
[i]t would seem that the only justification a physician could have
for participating in the administration of experimental or
investigational agents without consent is that the physician
sincerely believes that the agents are therapeutic under combat
conditions. This is a difficult position to defend, because war
does not change the investigational nature of a drug or vaccine.
(emphasis added)78
Thus, Annas appears to take the position that the regulatory status of a
product as investigational is also incontrovertible evidence that the
product is non-therapeutic, and therefore failure to obtain consent is a per
se violation of the Nuremberg Code. Similarly, bioethicist Arthur Caplan,
a member of the President's Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans'
176. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, (1964) (as
amended by the 29th World Medical Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, October 1975, and
the 35th World Medical Assembly, Venice, Italy, October 1983), available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/helsinki.php3 (last visited July 10, 2002). The Declaration of
Helsinki provides:
[i]n the field of biomedical research a fundamental distinction must be
recognized between medical research in which the aim is essentially
diagnostic or therapeutic for a patient, and medical research, the essential
object of which is purely scientific and without implying direct diagnostic
or therapeutic value to the person subjected to the research.
177. Id. §11 (5) ("If the physician considers it essential not to obtain informed
consent, the specific reasons for this proposal should be stated in the experimental
protocol for transmission to the independent committee.").
178. Annas, supra note 167, at 257.
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Illnesses, stated that "[t]he use of unapproved, unlicensed agents was
clearly understood by FDA and DOD to be research inasmuch as both
agencies recognized the need to seek waivers from prevailing informed
consent requirements."'7 9
It is no doubt true that the doctrine of informed consent "enjoys
talismanic - if not sacramental - status in modern life and thought."'
Consent's resonance stems in part from the real and unfortunate abuses of
human subjects that were perpetrated not only by the Nazis, but also by
our own government. Examples include the Cold War radiation
experiments,' s' the Tuskegee syphilis experiments. 2 and the army's
experimental administration of LSD to military personnel.' 3  The
requirement of consent also implicates core Western values of liberty,
autonomy and self-determination. Removal of consent invariably and
unavoidably raises the specter of a totalitarian regime that seeks to
subjugate individual free will and well being for the larger goals of the
state.
But an ethical analysis that focuses solely on consent, to the exclusion of
other issues, may mask deeper and more troubling concerns. This is
particularly the case with the use of investigational products for protection
of military personnel and for homeland defense. While there are troubling
aspects of both the substance and process of the interaction between FDA
and DOD that led to the decision to administer PB and BT during the
Gulf War, the single-minded focus on consent has unfortunately served to
deflect a thoughtful analysis of these more fundamental issues and to
impede regulatory improvements that could avoid similar problems in the
future.
At the heart of the decision to administer investigational products to
troops is the question of what is the appropriate balance of risks and
benefits. There has been no suggestion by even the critics of the Interim
Rule, that DOD sought to use PB and BT for other than the direct
179. Rettig, supra note 17, at 56.
180. Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and
the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 456 (1996).
181. U.S. government-sponsored radiation experiments were documented in
Final Report, Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, supra note
175.
182. See JAMES HOWARD JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT 1 (1993).
183. See e.g., Ted Gup, The Coldest Warrior, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001,
(Magazine) at W9; see also, Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1492 (11th Cir.
1986).
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protection of military personnel. In other words, there has been no claim
that military personnel were serving as "healthy volunteers," who receive
investigational products knowing that they face risk in the absence of
potential benefit, in order that scientists may obtain knowledge of general
applicability that can potentially be of benefit to others.
Given that the primary purpose of administering these products during
the Gulf War was to protect the health of the military forces, the
appropriate calculus to use in judging the appropriateness of the decision
is one in which the risks to recipients are weighed against potential
benefits to these recipients. In this context, if the risk of using an
investigational product outweighs its possible benefit, no amount of
informed consent can or should justify its use. Conversely, if there is a
general scientific consensus that the potential benefit of these products is
greater than their potential side effects, then their use is clearly justified.
Withholding such use would be unethical, and the consent of military
personnel would be unnecessary according to current military rules.
However, the regulatory category of "investigational," in reality,
encompasses a lengthy continuum that spans from the first use of a new
agent in humans (i.e., Phase I trials), to the decision by FDA to approve
an application to market the new product, be it NDA or BLA. Many
pitfalls, both scientific and non-scientific, can derail or impede progress
along this continuum. Moreover, there is no regulatory distinction within
this continuum between substances about which much is presently known
from already-existing uses, and those whose safety and effectiveness
profile is a blank slate. There is also no official recognition of the fact
that, at some point along the continuum, investigational products may
have demonstrated therapeutic benefit, at least for some populations
under some circumstances, despite their officially investigational status.
While FDA has taken steps to examine the different stages along the
continuum and to permit the broader use of investigational products in
particular circumstances, none of these exceptions apparently were
considered appropriate for Gulf War combatants.
Thus, when faced with the task of determining whether it was
appropriate to permit the administration of PB and BT to military
personnel, FDA found itself with the need to fit a proverbial square peg
into a round hole. While neither FDA nor DOD considered the proposed
use to be research in the conventional sense, FDA had conferred only
"investigational status" on the product. This necessitated following the
provisions suitable to research subjects. In other words, because it had no
alternative regulatory paradigm - i.e., one that acknowledged the different
stopping points along the investigational continuum - all of the
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deliberating about informed consent of necessity took place within the
confines of the human subject provisions.
FDA was therefore left open to the charge that it had inappropriately
manipulated regulations designed to protect research subjects to advance
military objectives at the expense of the rights, dignity and safety of
military personnel. In reality, however, FDA's actions are more
appropriately characterized as permitting the use of less-than-fully
approved treatments for a particularly high-risk population in a non-
traditional setting, and, moreover, a setting in which military regulations
already require soldiers to submit to medical care under certain
conditions.' 8'
The task facing FDA was to determine whether the risks inherent in the
particular use of PB and BT was justified by the potential benefit to
soldiers, i.e., whether the risk of untreated exposure to chemical and
biological agents was greater than the potential side effects of these
products. The purpose of assessing the risks and benefits was to
determine the best therapeutic approach for the soldiers, and was not to
answer a research question.
The lack of an appropriate regulatory paradigm also led FDA to
reinterpret its existing regulations governing human subject protection in a
manner that could have had troubling ethical ramifications in the future,
had they not been revoked. FDA interpreted "infeasible" to include, for
the first time, considerations external to the recipient of the investigational
product. The implications of such an interpretation could have proved
difficult to constrain. For example, could such an interpretation include
the use of an investigational vaccine on prisoners without their consent to
prevent an outbreak of infectious disease within the prison? Arguably, it
would be infeasible to obtain consent in a prison population because
refusal of any one prisoner could endanger the entire prison population.
The same might be true of an infectious disease outbreak among
institutionalized children. Indeed, there are many potential circumstances
where public health objectives are at odds with individual preferences.
While decisions that promote the former at the expense of the latter, such
as the decision to waive informed consent requirements, may be ethically
defensible, it is not because consent in such cases is "infeasible," but rather
because we place a higher value in those circumstances on the attainment
184. Army Regulation 600-20, 5-4 (2002) (stating: "A soldier on active duty or
active duty for training will usually be required to submit to medical care
considered necessary to preserve his or her life, alleviate undue suffering, or
protect or maintain the health of others.").
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of public health than on the honoring of individual preferences. To decide
such cases on the grounds of infeasibility conflates quite different
situations. Infeasibility should be limited to those circumstances wherein
is truly not possible to obtain consent from the individual because of that
individual's incapacity, physical or mental, but where it is believed that the
intervention is in the individual's best interest. Decisions made on public
health protection and/or national security grounds, including protection of
other members of the military, should be made under a basis different
from infeasibility, one that recognizes that sometimes tensions exist,
perhaps unavoidable ones, between protecting individuals and protecting
the public.
Another troubling reality brought to light by the Gulf War experience is
what may be termed the "orphan IND by 1990, both BT and PB had been
under an IND for a fairly long period of time; the IND for PB was filed by
DOD in 1984 and the IND for BT was filed by CDC in 1965.185 Yet neither
product had progressed beyond the IND stage. The reasons for this are
unclear, but likely relate, at least in part, to the lack of a commercial
market for these products, and therefore a lack of incentive on the part of
the sponsors to seek approval of the product. In addition, in the case of
drugs to prevent illness from exposure to life-threatening chemical or
biological agents, there are ethical restrictions that prevent testing the
effectiveness of these agents in humans, which has traditionally been a
requirement before FDA will approve these products. However,
regardless of the reasons that some INDs become stuck during their
journey, the consequence of the failure to progress to final product
approval is that the investigational product is frozen along the continuum,
and is at a perpetually ambiguous status. As a result, when the products
are needed for therapeutic purposes, concerns necessarily arise over their
use. It is unclear how many INDs are currently languishing in this
developmental phase, but as the Gulf War experience suggests, it is
counterproductive to leave products in a perpetually investigational phase,
and the rights conferred by the granting of an IND should also entail a
responsibility to shepherd the IND diligently along the path to approval.
A final troubling aspect of the Gulf War experience is that it required
complex risk-benefit decisionmaking to be conducted within an extremely
short time frame. Policy-making in the shadow of military conflict is not
conducive to a reflective and deliberative approach. DOD approached
FDA regarding the use of PB and BT on October 30, 1990, and FDA
185. Rettig, supra note 17, at 6.
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issued its decision on December 21, 1990.'86 FDA was no doubt keenly
aware that war was imminent and that its decision could mean life or
death for thousands of military personnel. In light of this pressure, FDA
used the regulatory tools at its disposal, however awkward and ill-fitting,
to achieve objectives it believed were in the interest of both individual
military personnel and national security. It also appears to have granted
considerable deference to DOD in terms of following the record-keeping
and information-providing requirements of the IND--agreements that
DOD appears to have been unable to fulfill.'87 Ideally, deliberations on
such matters should be conducted before crises arise, and agreements
worked out without the press of imminent war. Such prospective decision-
making can better ensure that all the relevant factors and concerns are
addressed.
3. Consequences
Following the Gulf War, it was expected that FDA would finalize the
Interim Rule. This, however, did not happen. The reasons are unclear,
and could reflect internal ambivalence over the rule, external criticism of
FDA for adopting it or simply the press of more immediate business (or
some combination of these three). The Presidential Advisory Committee
on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, which operated from 1995 until 1997,
recommended that FDA complete the rulemaking process it had begun."
In response, FDA published a request for comments on the merits of
finalizing, modifying or revoking the Interim Rule. 9 The overwhelming
majority of comments FDA received opposed the interim rule and argued
that informed consent is essential for military personnel.' 9°
186. 55 Fed. Reg. 52814 (Dec 21, 1990) (regulations repealed).
187. Rettig, supra note 17 at 33-34.
188. Rettig, supra note 17, at 35-38, (citing Presidential Advisory Committee on
Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Interim Report, February 1996 and Presidential
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Final Report, December
1996).
189. 62 Fed. Reg. 40996 (July 31, 1997).
190. 64 Fed. Reg. 54180 (Oct. 5, 1999). According to FDA, the agency received
134 comments on whether it should revoke or amend the Interim Rule, 119 of
which opposed the rule and recommended revocation:
Most of these comments opposed the agency's continued use of the
interim rule after the experience of the Persian Gulf War. Many thought
it should never have been used. Specifically, 114 comments stated that
informed consent was absolutely essential and that military personnel,
like other nonmilitary citizens, should receive adequate information about
an investigational product before its use and have the right to refuse to
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By mid-1998, it was known that FDA was leaning towards revoking the
Rule, despite DOD's objections. Legislation adopted in October 1998,
effectively mooted the issue. Known as the Byrd Amendment, the
legislation vested the authority to grant waivers of informed consent for
the use of an IND product solely in the President of the United States,
based on criteria to be established by FDA.1 91 Thereafter, FDA formally
revoked the Interim Rule and issued the criteria to be used by the
President in reviewing waiver requests."
Since the enactment of the Byrd Amendment, there have been no
requests to waive consent. The result of the Amendment appears to have
been to deter DOD from using products that have not yet been licensed.193
While some may applaud this move as affording greater protection to
military personnel, it has limited DOD's options when faced with possible
chemical or biological threats. In addition, the failure of the military to
pursue approval of investigational products for which they are the sponsor
could be detrimental to homeland security if terrorists widen the scope of
biological agents to include civilian targets.
B. BioPort and the Continuing Controversy over the Anthrax Vaccine
During the Gulf War, DOD was also concerned about the potential
exposure of troops to anthrax, to which Saddam Hussein was believed to
have access. DOD therefore ordered the vaccination of approximately
receive it. Seventeen comments stressed the need for followup of possible
adverse reactions to investigational products, and 15 comments indicated
that DOD could not fulfill its responsibilities even if FDA required
adequate followup and other requirements as part of a new regulation.
Five comments stated that DOD had shown itself to be incapable of
adequate oversight and recordkeeping and three comments noted that the
interim rule had not been implemented by DOD as had been intended.
Several comments suggested that if the rule were to be used again, there
must be an independent board of medical and ethical experts, there must
be an institutional review board independent of DOD, and there must be
proper monitoring that could only be done by non-DOD personnel.
Id. at 54181.
191. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(2000).
192. FDA issued an Interim Final Rule describing these criteria in 1999. 64
Fed. Reg. 54180 (Oct. 1999). More recently, the agency announced its intention to
issue a final rule by July 2002. Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, 67 Fed. Reg.
33039 (May 13, 2002).
193. Rettig et al., supra note 125, at 15.
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150,000 troops going to the Gulf.'94 However, because a vaccine for
anthrax had previously been licensed by FDA, neither FDA nor DOD
considered it to be an investigational product.'95 For this reason the
anthrax vaccine was not included in DOD's waiver request to FDA.
The lack of controversy was, however, short-lived. Following the war,
U.N. inspectors confirmed that Iraq had produced and weaponized
anthrax.'" Following several years of internal debate, in December 1997,
the Pentagon announced that all troops and reservists would be vaccinated
against anthrax.' 97 This decision was made in response to "heightened
194. Bradley Graham, Pentagon Plans to Inoculate Troops Against Anthrax
Bacteria, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1997, at A23.
195. Some critics have erroneously argued that the administration of AVA for
prophylaxis against inhalational anthrax is "investigational" because the labeling
for AVA does not explicitly include inhalational anthrax as an indication for use.
See Randall D. Katz, Friendly Fire: The Mandatory Military Anthrax Vaccination
Program, 50 DUKE L.J. 1835, 1859-1861 (2001). This claim erroneously conflates
the category of "investigational" with the "off-label" administration of an
approved product. A product is investigational -- within the meaning of the
FD&C Act and FDA regulations --only if it is the subject of an IND. An IND, in
turn, is required of an approved product only if it is administered in the context of
a clinical study protocol. On the other hand, a product that has been approved for
one indication by FDA and is subsequently administered for a use not explicitly
indicated in its labeling may constitute an off-label use. FDA has long taken the
position that the decision to administer a product for indications not included in
labeling is within the scope of medical practice and constitutes a clinical judgment,
and is therefore not appropriately within the purview of FDA regulations. See,
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS AND CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, 1998. Update, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/offlabel.html (last visited July 8, 2002). Thus, while
the administration of AVA for inhalational anthrax may arguably constitute an
off-label use, it is not correct to characterize the vaccine as investigational for this
purpose.
196. The seriousness of the Iraqi threat was confirmed by written evidence from
within the regime when Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Karnel Hassan,
defected in 1995, carrying documents demonstrating that the Iraqis's had
stockpiled 8,000 liters of anthrax spore suspension and 20,000 liters of botulinum
toxin, and had also armed SCUD missiles with 400 pounds of biological warheads
with a range of 300 to 600 kilometers. Philip M. Polgreen and Charles Helms,
Vaccines, Biological Warfare, and Bioterrorism, 28 PRIMARY CARE: CLINICS IN
OFFICE PRACTICE 807, 809 (2001).
197. Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Armed Forces to be Vaccinated Against Anthrax,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at Al.
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Pentagon concern about the prospect of biological attack,"'1 98 based on
information that "Iraq, Russia and as many as 10 other countries [had] ...
the capability to load spores of anthrax into weapons.""' DOD's decision
created a significantly increased demand for the vaccine. Indeed, DOD
estimated the need for 2.4 million troop equivalent doses .2  To fulfill its
requirements, DOD turned to the sole U.S. manufacturer of the vaccine,
BioPort . 1
This company, however, had a rather convoluted and financially
troubled history with a record of repeated non-compliance with FDA
requirements, as will be described in this section.
The currently marketed product, anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA), is
manufactured using "old-fashioned" laboratory methods, in which the part
of the toxin produced by the anthrax bacillus known as "protective
antigen," is isolated, purified, and prepared for administration to
humans. 2' Data demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of the current
vaccine was derived from research conducted at Fort Detrick (then Camp
Detrick) in the 1950s to develop methods to grow the bacteria in a
laboratory, and to concentrate, stabilize and purify protective antigen.20 '
Researchers at Merck, Sharpe and Dohme developed a vaccine that was
tested by Brachman, et. al. in field trials conducted from 1955-1959 in goat
198. Bradley Graham, Military Chiefs Back Anthrax Inoculations; Initiative
Would Affect All of Nation's Forces, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1996, at Al.
199. Id. Other events also contributed to the increased concern regarding
bioterrorism. These included the release of Salmonella by the Rajneesh cult in
The Dalles, Oregon in 1984 and the release of sarin gas by the cult, Aum
Shinrikyo, in Tokyo, Japan in 1995. See also, JUDITH MILLER, STEPHEN
ENGELBERG, AND WILLIAM BROAD, GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND
AMERICA'S SECRET WAR 15-33, 151-164 (2001).
200. Meyers, supra note 197. A troop equivalent dose, or TED, represents the
number of shots required to achieve immunization multiplied by the number of
troops to be immunized.
201. Id.
202. "The [anthrax] toxin has three major components: protective antigen,
lethal factor and edema factor. When the toxin is released in the body," the
protective antigen binds to the surface of target cells in a manner that allows the
other two components to infiltrate and destroy the cell. The vaccine is designed to
stimulate the production of antibodies against protective antigen, in order to
prevent it from binding to cells. Thomas H. Maugh, II, Anthrax and Smallpox
Shots Present Manufacturing Problems and Dangerous Side Effects, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2001, at A14.
203. IOM Report, supra note 10, at 48.
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hair-processing plants in the eastern United States." This was the only
randomized, controlled clinical trial conducted with a protective antigen-
containing vaccine.0 5 It demonstrated efficacy against cutaneous anthrax.'
Because the number of individuals who contracted anthrax by inhalation
was so small, it was not possible to assess the vaccine's efficacy against this
form of the disease.2°
In 1966, the CDC submitted an IND for AVA to the Bureau of
Biologics, which at that time was under the jurisdiction of the NIH.2 8 The
Michigan Department of Public Health (MDPH) developed this vaccine,
at the request of the federal government.2°9 The MDPH vaccine differed
from the Merck vaccine in several respects.2 1 ' Nevertheless, both the
MDPH vaccine and the Merck vaccine were used in industrial settings
(e.g., textile mills) during the 1960s, and FDA relied on data generated
from both vaccines when evaluating the safety and effectiveness of AVA.
In 1970, the Bureau of Biologics granted a license for AVA to the
MDPH.2 1 ' The approved indication was "only for certain occupational
groups with a risk of uncontrollable or unavoidable exposure to the
organism, ' 2 and MDPH produced the vaccine primarily for veterinary,
laboratory and industrial workers. The license did not specify the form of
anthrax for which it was indicated, and the vaccine has been used to
protect those at risk from all forms of the disease, notwithstanding the lack
of human clinical evidence. Evidence from animal studies supports the
view that the vaccine is protective against inhalational anthrax as well, but
the relevance of this data to humans is limited.213 The vaccine was
approved as a series of six shots over eighteen months, with an annual
204. GAO REPORT: SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra




208. IOM Report, supra note 10, at 136.
209. Merck apparently lost interest in developing the vaccine because of its
small market, and no other company was willing to produce it. Mike Toner,
Anthrax Vaccine Mired in Red Tape, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 11, 2001, at lB.
210. Among other differences, the AVA and Merck vaccines used a different
strain of the anthrax bacillus, different purification and concentration procedures,
and a different adjuvant and preservative. IOM Report, supra note 10, at 137.
211. IOM report, supra note 10, at 136.
212. Id. at 84.
213. GAO REPORT: SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra
note 123, at 5-6.
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booster, although no studies have been done to determine the optimum
number of doses of the vaccine.1 4
Prior to recent concerns about bioterrorism, the anthrax vaccine had a
very small market. Only 68,000 doses were distributed by MDPH between
1974 and 1989,215 and the MDPH consistently lost money.2 16 In 1996,
Michigan Governor John Engler provided the impetus for the creation of
a new governmental corporation, the Michigan Biologics Products
Institute (MBPI), comprising what had formerly been the vaccine
production unit of the MDPH.217
In 1998, Michigan transferred ownership and licenses of MBPI to
BioPort, a newly formed corporation.2 ' At the time of the transfer, the
FDA had already cited MBPI for failure to comply with various FDA
requirements, in particular with its GMP requirements, among others.19
FDA issued several warning letters to the company, including one stating
its intent to revoke the facility's license if corrective actions proved
214. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOf/-NSIAD-99-226, MEDICAL
READINESS: ISSUES CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX VACCINE 1 (1999) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT: ISSUES CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX VACCINE]. In 1998, BioPort
submitted an IND to FDA for a study to determine whether the number could be
reduced from six shots to five. Id. at 2.
215. U.S. GEN. ACCOUTING OFFICE, GAOr-NSIAD-00-48, ANTHRAX
VACCINE: SAFETY AND EFFICACY ISSUES 5 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT:
SAFETY AND EFFICACY ISSUES].
216. Judith Miller, Company Led By Top Admiral Buys Michigan Vaccine Lab,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at A19.
217. History of BioPort Corporation, at http://www.bioport.com/AboutBioPort/
BioPortHistory/HistoryBioPort-Corporate.asp (last visited November 13, 2002).
218. Partners in the corporation were Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., former
Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and former U.S. Ambassador to Britain,
Fuad El-Hibri, German national who previously privatized the British
Government's vaccine production plant, the Neogen Corporation, and MBPI. Id.
Financial backing for BioPort came from a Netherlands Antilles investment
company owned by El-Hibri's father, Ibrahim Hibri. Bradley Graham, Anthrax
Vaccine Firm in Trouble; Pentagon's Innoculation Program Supplier Near
Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, July 1, 1999, at A27.
219. For example, a 1997 report by FDA criticized the company's "failure to
establish and/or follow written procedures for product and process controls
designed to assure that products have the identity, strength, quality, and purity
they purport or represent to possess." Thomas D. Williams, Reports Criticize
Anthrax Vaccine's Manufacturer; Federal Inspections Find Quality-Control
Problems at Firm, HARTFORD COURANT, May 22, 2000, at Al. See also, IOM
Report, supra note 10, at 190-193.
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inadequate.2 MBPI also failed to follow required reporting procedures.
For example, in the early 1990s, MBPI changed the filters it had been
using to manufacture the vaccine without notifying FDA.221 Upon taking
ownership of MBPI in 1998, BioPort did not validate the filters to
demonstrate consistency of the end product.2 2 Studies by DOD indicated
that the composition of the vaccine changed after the filters were replaced,
but studies have not been conducted to evaluate if these changes affected
the safety or effectiveness of the vaccine.23 FDA was apparently unaware
of the filter changes until the GAO issued a report in late 2001.24 FDA
was not granted access to inspect the facility prior to 1993 because "its
inspectors had not been vaccinated against anthrax."22
FDA's faultfinding continued after MBPI was transferred to BioPort,
and FDA inspectors repeatedly found violations such as lot contamination
and substantial deviations from GMPs.2 2 6 BioPort, in turn, looked to
DOD, its main customer, for a major infusion of capital it claimed it
needed to continue producing the vaccine 27 DOD, facing a significant
demand and perceiving no other alternatives, more than doubled the
amount it had contracted to pay BioPort for the vaccine, 2' and advanced
220. IOM Report, supra note 10 at 190-193.
221. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE., GAO-02-181T, ANTHRAX VACCINE,
CHANGES TO THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS 5-7 (2001) [hereinafter GAO
Report: Changes to the Manufacturing Process].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. FDA reviewed its potency data results and stated that it did not detect
any changes in potency testing results throughout the time period in which filters
were changed. Sabin Russell, Anthrax Vaccine Report Shows Spikes in Potency,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2,2001, at Al.
225. GAO REPORT: SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra
note 123, at 6.
226. Rich Hein, Anthrax Shot Fears Rise; More Troops Refusing Order to be
Vaccinated, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, at 3.
227. GEN. ACCOUNTING. OFFICE., GAO/T-NSIAD-99-214, CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT: OBSERVATIONS ON DOD's FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
ANTHRAX VACCINE MANUFACTURER 2 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT:
OBSERVATIONS ON DOD's FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ANTHRAX
VACCINE MANUFACTURER].
228. Bradley Graham, Anthrax Vaccine Firm in Trouble; Pentagon's
Innoculation Program Supplier Near Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, July 1, 1999, at
A27; Steven Lee Meyers, U.S. Doubles Payment to Sole Source of Anthrax
Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at A16.
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the company millions of dollars.229 In 1998, BioPort shut down the facility
for more than a year to conduct extensive renovations, during which time
no new vaccine was produced.230 In November 1999, FDA inspectors
identified about thirty deficiencies in the new, larger plant that precluded
licensure of the new facility or the vaccine produced therein. 23' The
following year, "FDA inspectors cited BioPort for 18 violations of
manufacturing procedures. ' , 232  The violations included a lack of
consistency in the manufacturing process and problems with sterility,
packaging and filling procedures.233 Inspectors also cited BioPort for
failing to properly track and investigate reports of serious adverse
reactions by people who received the vaccine.234 FDA did not permit
BioPort to release lots of the vaccine until January 31, 2002, after
approving a supplement to the BLA to have the vaccine filled by another
laboratory.
In December 1997, Secretary Cohen announced plans to vaccinate all
military personnel with the anthrax vaccine.236 The Pentagon subsequently
had to scale back and postpone the vaccination program, known as the
Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP), after it became clear
that BioPort's problems would create a significant shortage of the
229. In 1999, DOD provided an interest-free advance payment of $18.7 million.
In 2000, DOD provided an additional thirteen million dollars to BioPort's
contract, in part to hire technical assistance in obtaining FDA approval. DOD also
extended the schedule for BioPort to repay its interest-free advance and returned
$7.4 million that the company had repaid for the $18.7 million advance. GEN.
ACCOUNTING. OFFICE., GAO/T-NDIAD-00-140, CONTRACT MANAGEMENT:
DOD's ANTHRAX VACCINE MANUFACTURER WILL CONTINUE TO NEED
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 1 (2000).
230. Keith Bradsher, A Nation Challenged: The Supplies; The Only U.S.
Laboratory for the Anthrax Vaccine Says Production Will Be Delayed, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2001, at B7.
231. Bradley Graham, Pentagon Anthrax Program Suffers Setback; New
Manufacturing Plant Fails FDA Inspection; Inoculation Expansion Delayed, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 1999, at A12.
232. Thomas D. Williams, Vaccine Maker Again Gets Low Grades From U.S.
Inspectors, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 31, 2000, at A6.
233. Id.
234. Thomas D. Williams, Vaccine Manufacturer Faulted; FDA Cites Failure to
Track Effects of Anthrax Inoculation, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 11, 2000, at A14.
235. Justin Gillis, FDA Releases Anthrax Vaccine to Military, Approves More.,
WASH. POST., Feb. 1, 2002, at A 17.
236. Graham, supra note 194.
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vaccine." Following the initial vaccination order, several soldiers refused
orders to be vaccinated because of concerns regarding possible side effects
of the vaccine, concerns which stemmed in part from the possibility that
the vaccine was responsible for ailments experienced by some Gulf War
veterans. 21' The military instituted various disciplinary measures, on an
individual basis, for such refusals, including discharge from military
239service. Overall, as many as 400 active service members have resigned
or been court martialed for refusing the vaccine.4 0 In addition, an
unknown number of National Guard and reserve personnel chose to leave
rather than be vaccinated.4 ' A GAO report criticized DOD for
inadequate monitoring of adverse reactions to the vaccine, 22 and noted the
limitations of using a "passive" monitoring system.243
Most recently, following the intentional distribution of anthrax through
the U.S. mail, the CDC began offering the anthrax vaccine to those
237. Eliot Marshall, DOD Retreats on Plan for Anthrax Vaccine, 289 SCIENCE
382, 382-383, July 21, 2000.
238. Anita Manning, Anthrax Vaccine Injects Anger into Military Fearing
Reactions, Troops Quit the Service, USA TODAY, Oct 19, 1999, at 8D.
239. Jim Ritter, Anthrax Shot Fears Rise; More Troops Refusing Order to be
Vaccinated, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, at 3.
240. Maugh, supra note 202, at 14.
241. In 2000, the GAO conducted a survey of 1,253 randomly selected Guard
and Reserve Pilots and other aircrew members to assess attitudes about AVIP.
The survey found that anthrax was a key reason that participants cited for leaving
the military or changing their military status. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-
01-92T, ANTHRAX VACCINE: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF GAO's SURVEY OF
GUARD/RESERVE PILOTS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS (2000).
242. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-00-36, MEDICAL READINESS:
DOD FACES CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING ITS ANTHRAX VACCINE
IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT: DOD FACES
CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING ITS ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION
PROGRAM]; Thomas D. Williams, Military's Anthrax-Vaccination Program
Criticized; Watchdog Agency Lists Deficiencies, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 29,
1999, at A8.
243. DOD uses the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS),
established in 1990 and administered by FDA and CDC. The system relies on
vaccine recipients and health care providers to report adverse events. This form of
surveillance detects only a small fraction of adverse events. In contrast, an active
surveillance system, in which health care workers monitor vaccine recipients to
find out if they have had adverse reactions, is a more reliable indicator of a
vaccine's safety. GAO REPORT: ISSUES CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX VACCINE,
supra note 214, at 3-4; GAO REPORT: SAFETY AND EFFICACY ISSUES, supra note
215, at 5.
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already exposed. Because the original license for the vaccine did not
include post-exposure prophylaxis, the administration of the vaccine is
being conducted under an IND. Thus far, 192 people have chosen to
participate,2" which represents only a small fraction of those potentially
exposed."5
The controversy over the vaccine's safety, effectiveness and
manufacturing, led to several government-sponsored analysis efforts.
Between 1999 and 2001, the GAO issued several reports concerning the
vaccine .2' These studies noted a lack of data on long-term safety and
efficacy and that the limited data regarding short-term adverse reactions
suggested a higher rate of adverse reactions in women. 7 They also cited
several disadvantages with the method of production, such as the inability
to measure the amount of protective antigen precisely, variation between
lots of the product, and evidence suggesting diminished efficacy against
certain virulent strains of anthrax.2"GAO noted the advantages of
developing a "second generation recombinant vaccine ... [using] a process
that ... [can be] fully defined, quantified, and controlled."
249
In March 2002, the Institute of Medicine released a report in which it
concluded that AVA is both effective against all forms of anthrax and
reasonably safe. Specifically, the report found that the rate of adverse
reactions, both local and systemic, was comparable to other adult
vaccines, 2 o and that while data is limited there was "no convincing
244. IOM Report, supra note 10, at 50.
245. Sheryl Gay Stollberg, A Nation Challenged: Steps Against Anthrax;
Civilians Are Reluctant to Join U.S. Test of Anthrax Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2002, at A13; Ceci Connolly, Workers Exposed to Anthrax Shun Vaccine; Low
Participation Is Blamed on Confusing Signals From U.S. Health Authorities, WASH.
POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A6.
246. GAO REPORT: SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra
note 123; GAO REPORT: ISSUES CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra
note 214; GAO REPORT: DOD FACES CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING ITS
ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM, supra note 242; GAO REPORT:
SAFETY AND EFFICACY ISSUES, supra note 215; GAO Report: Changes to the
Manufacturing Process, supra note 221; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-
NSIAD-00-157, DOD Continues to Face Challenges in Implementing Its Anthrax
Vaccine Immunization Program (2000).
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248. Id.
249. GAO REPORT: ISSUES CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra note
214, at 10.
250. IOM Report, supra note 10, at 12.
Drugs and Vaccines for the Common Defense
evidence at this time [of] elevated risk of later-onset [adverse] events. '
Nevertheless, the Committee concluded that reliance on the current
vaccine was "far from satisfactory," and that there is a "need for research
toward the development of a different and better anthrax vaccine, as well
as a need for improvements in monitoring the safety of the current
vaccine. ' ' 2
The history of the anthrax vaccine exposes a number of troubling
realities. First, it is clear, in retrospect, that DOD did not appreciate the
substantial hurdles BioPort faced in achieving FDA compliance or the
significance of FDA's regulatory role. Lacking this awareness, DOD
made decisions, such as the decision to vaccinate all troops, without
assessing the capability of BioPort to produce sufficient vaccine,
particularly in light of BioPort's ongoing difficulties in complying with
FDA requirements. For example, the renovations conducted by BioPort
to modernize its facilities, while necessary, also meant that the company,
in essence, needed FDA to re-approve the vaccine, since FDA considers
the facility in which a vaccine is produced to be an integral component of
the vaccine's overall safety and effectiveness. Additionally, it appears that
DOD did not, until recently, perceive the need to take a leading role in
developing alternate anthrax vaccines through means of biotechnology,
which presumably would be less subject to the production difficulties faced
by legacy vaccines, such as the BioPort vaccine. Notably, although the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) developed a recombinant vaccine in 1995, it did not
conduct clinical trials to test safety because it considered further
development of the vaccine to be an "unfunded requirement. ' ' 3 More
recently, however, DOD has begun collaborating with the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to develop a recombinant vaccine,' and has
251. Id. at 14.
252. Id. at 15. Specifically, the IOM found that "[t]he current anthrax vaccine is
difficult to standardize, is incompletely characterized, and is relatively reactogenic.
.and the dose schedule is long and challenging. An anthrax vaccine free of these
drawbacks is needed, and such improvements are feasible. Id. at 20.
253. GAO REPORT: ISSUES CONCERNING THE ANTHRAX VACCINE, supra note
214, at 10.
254. Dave Eberhart, Anthrax Vaccine? No, Not Yet, NEWSMAX.COM, Oct. 29,
2001, at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/28/210212.shtml (last
visited August 2, 2002).
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also begun collaborating with private firms to develop new prevention and
treatment methods. 255
Second, it is similarly apparent that FDA historically did not take an
active role in trying to bring BioPort into compliance. Inspectors
repeatedly found violations, but it is unclear how much follow-up or
assistance was provided to the company. Ordinarily, perhaps, this would
be the desirable course. Arguably, the appropriate role of the regulatory
agency is to identify regulatory deficiencies and permit the private
company to correct them or suffer the consequences. Furthermore, given
limited resources, a vaccine serving only a small number of people, as was
historically the case with the anthrax vaccine, should perhaps not be the
agency's highest priority. However, when the context becomes national
security and broad-based public health protection, it is insufficient simply
to identify problems periodically and hope they are corrected. Rather,
more active intervention is required, stemming from the awareness that
the product at issue is vital, and a safe, effective and stable supply must be
maintained.
Related to this second concern, BioPort is a stark example of the
fragility of the U.S. vaccine industry generally, and particularly in the
context of vaccines likely to be employed in a biological attack. Vaccines
are a small, and not very profitable, segment of the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, representing only one or two percent of global pharmaceutical
sales.256 As a consequence, there are few major pharmaceutical firms
involved in their production-primarily in the childhood vaccine market-
and many vaccines are manufactured by only one manufacturer. Indeed,
of the ten leading pharmaceutical companies in terms of sales, only four
produce vaccines. Thus, there is little redundancy in the system, and
production problems by one manufacturer have had resounding effects
255. "For example, army researchers are working with EluSys Therapeutics
Inc., a small New Jersey company, to develop an early monoclonal antibody
treatment for soldiers when they are first exposed to anthrax." Ronald Rosenberg,
Shot Against Bioterrorism: US Companies Like Oravax in Cambridge Are
Producing New Smallpox, Anthrax, and Other Vaccines for Soldiers And Civilians,
But Are We Stockpiling Enough Drugs to Meet the Threat?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
4, 2000, at D4. See also, Marsha Austin, Better Anthrax Vaccine Claimed Denver
Company Ready for Fast Track, DENVER POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at Cl; Thomas D.
Williams, Anthrax: Safe, Effective Vaccine Proves Elusive; Responding to
Terrorism, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 6,2001, at Al.
256. Donald S. Burke, Vaccine Vuneralibility: National Security Dimension,
Address at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Society of Alumni
Event (March 21, 2002).
257. Id.
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throughout the population. This was clearly evident in the fall of 2001,
when shortages occurred with a number of childhood vaccines, and delays
occurred in the distribution of several others.58 Overall, of twenty-three
licensed vaccines, three were withdrawn because of safety concerns, delays
in supply have occurred with four, the supply of three was insufficient, and
seven, although currently in stable supply, are produced by only a single
manufacturer.5 9
Lack of profitability and redundancy are an even greater concern
for vaccines for national security, as "military vaccines represent a highly
specialized niche market of minimal commercial interest to the
pharmaceutical industry. ' ' 6  The manufacturers of vaccines for agents
likely to be used in biological attacks have largely been small, unknown
and sometimes offshore entities, rather than well-known U.S. companies
with a proven track record. Notably, all three vaccines manufactured for
biodefense-anthrax, plague and smallpox-are manufactured by only a
single source that does not have sufficient capacity to produce them.26'
Although the events of 9/11 may have led to an increased interest by big
firms because of the increased financial incentives to develop these
vaccines, they still cannot compete with "blockbuster" drugs.
Nevertheless, ensuring their availability is as vital to the national defense
and public health as is the military, emergency services and roads. This is
particularly true, since the anthrax vaccine experience demonstrates that
vaccines considered to be solely a military need may quickly become
needed for the broader population. Thus, like other common goods,
vaccines must not be permitted to fall victim to what has traditionally been
termed the "tragedy of the commons," but must be supported so that their
availability can be assured.
The BioPort experience may serve as an opportunity to improve the
availability of vaccines in the future. As will be discussed in greater detail
in part VII, FDA can take several concrete steps to help ensure the
availability of safe, and effective vaccines for military and homeland
defense.
258. Robert Pear, Shortage of Juvenile Vaccines Worries Doctors and Officials,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001 at 38. Jonathan Bor, Shortages Hamper Children's
Vaccination; Doctors Fear U.S. Could Lose Ground in Fighting Illnesses,
BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 23, 2002, at 1A.
259. Burke, supra note 256.
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C. Organizational Considerations
A third reason for concern regarding the impact of FDA requirements
on the availability of products to counter bioterrorism stems not from any
particular event or episode, but rather from a much more intangible, but
no less influential factor, namely, the "culture" of FDA. In trying to
describe FDA culture or to ascribe it practical significance, a few caveats
are in order. First, it would be incorrect to ascribe a single, unified and
static culture to the agency as a whole. FDA comprises several
independent centers, each with its own director and staff, and each with
different institutional histories. Thus the culture of those tasked with
regulating drugs may be quite different from that of biological products,
which may in turn be quite different from that of medical devices. Second,
the culture of any agency is necessarily influenced by who is at the helm,
and FDA is no exception. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs is
appointed by the President and is often selected because of the views
possessed by or ascribed to that individual, both about particular
controversial issues (e.g., abortion) and more generally about the proper
role of an administrative agency. Finally, formal historical analyses of
FDA's culture are sparse, and much of the information resides in the
minds of agency officials and former officials who have lived through
various periods, making it an elusive topic for description.
Nevertheless, certain attitudes and beliefs that have been woven into
the fabric of FDA's regulatory culture, stemming in part from the agency's
historical mandate and from particular episodes in the agency's history,
may present challenges to efforts to redirect FDA activities in the service
of national security objectives. Richard Merrill, in discussing the
challenges of mutual recognition agreements, has described three key
features of this culture: (1) a "strong tradition of tough-minded
regulation"; (2) the "widely-held conviction ... that the Agency is over-
extended and under-resourced"; and (3) a tradition of paternalism,
manifested in the agency's view of itself as "having responsibility to
protect citizens of other countries as well as citizens of our own.",
62
Another consistent description of the FDA's culture and core beliefs
comes from former Commissioner Jane Henney:
[a] public health regulatory agency like FDA must define and
maintain strong values in order to sustain consumer confidence
in FDA's commitment to protect and promote public health.
There are three such values that have been and should continue
262. Richard A. Merrill, The Importance and Challenges of Mutual Recognition
Agreements, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 742-746 (1998).
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to be FDA's bedrocks: credibility, integrity, and independence.
Credibility - the agency's credibility must be sound to fulfill its
mission. This includes scientific skill and knowledge, as well as
FDA's commitment to meeting society's need for public health
protection. Integrity-people working at FDA and those who
serve on its behalf must act and take actions that are above
reproach. FDA can ill-afford to have any questions raised
regarding its intent or any assertions made about potential or
real conflicts. Independence-a strong regulatory agency must
be able to exhibit and exert its independence free from undue
influence or conflicts of interest by any parties involved. These
values help to guide the agency in the right direction and help
shape the culture of an organization. Thus the workforce of
FDA, at any point in its almost one hundred year history, has
been guided by these values and committed to the protection of
the public health, using scientifically rigorous methodology to
underpin its decision."
Several key themes emerge from Merrill and Henney's descriptions.
First, the FDA culture is one that views as paramount the responsibility to
protect the public's health, by protecting consumers from dangerous
products. This view has been fostered in part by the legislative history of
its governing statutes and by the fear of the consequences of being
"wrong," i.e., of approving a product that later turns out to cause
unanticipated adverse effects. Second, the agency has an unassailable
commitment to "science," and specifically, to a particular view of science
that strictly adheres to the randomized clinical trial as the sine qua non of
safety and effectiveness. This process views clinical trial design and data
collection as paramount, and necessarily accepts that the process is time-
consuming, slow and not readily susceptible to strict timetables. A third,
and related theme is that the constraints of low resources and multiple
demands has led to an acceptance of the fact that not all areas within the
agency's jurisdiction will receive the same amount of attention as others,
and that certain subjects must remain on the back burner of the agency's
priorities. Finally, the agency's culture of independence, described by
Henney, in addition to signifying the agency's desire not to be perceived as
"beholden" to either the regulated industry or to other governmental
entities, also connotes an attitude that the agency need not accommodate
other interests, and rather that all those subject to FDA's authority must
adhere equally, without exceptions or alterations, to the agency's rules,
expectations and manner of conducting business.
263. Jane E. Henney, Remarks of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 55
FOOD DRUG L.J.1, 3 (2000).
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How then, might FDA's culture and values conflict with national
security objectives? First, there is reason for concern that FDA's
traditional conception of public health protection may miss an essential
dimension in its failure to pay sufficient attention to the risks associated
with not approving products because of concerns about inadequate safety
or effectiveness. This concern exists regarding all diseases-indeed, studies
have estimated the loss of life caused by delays in failing to approve such
drugs as streptokinase (a blood-clot dissolving agent) and beta blockers.
4
Pharmacologists William Wardell and Louis Lasagna noted, almost thirty
years ago, that whereas the introduction of a new drug that produced
significant fatalities "would be regarded as a major disaster" the
"occurrence of deaths through failure to introduce a drug has so far gone
unremarked."'2 65 Nevertheless, the failure to factor in the other side of the
public health equation in the national security context has even more
chilling ramifications since the objective of biological warfare and
bioterrorism is to incapacitate military forces and destabilize civilian
society. It is, therefore, more than a simple matter of excess deaths.
Second, where national security is concerned, time is often "of the
essence" in a way not typical of products for other uses. The timing of
military campaigns is unpredictable (or not subject to disclosure) and may
occur on short notice. Similarly, information concerning possible
bioterrorist threats may be obtained with very little lead-time for
preparing the civilian population. As FDA's actions during the Gulf War
illustrate, decision-making under threat of war is less than ideal for
reflective deliberation. Furthermore, as seen with the length of time it
took FDA to promulgate a new regulation for the use of animal data -
more than two and a half years - FDA's timetable is somewhat longer
than might be optimal in the military context. Thus, mechanisms must be
in place both to expedite products and regulations in the service of
national security and to resolve new regulatory concerns in a manner that
avoids precipitous action with potentially far-reaching implications.
Third, availability of drugs and vaccines needed for national security
cannot be subject to shifting FDA priorities and resource constraints.
Rather, they require a consistent and vigilant level of regulatory oversight
to ensure that they are available, if needed, and that any problems that
arise during development or production are resolved expeditiously.
264. Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the FDA
Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 651, 654-655 (1996).
265. Id. at 655 (quoting WILLIAM M. WARDELL & Louis LASAGNA,
REGULATION & DRUG DEVELOPMENT 73 (1975)).
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Currently, however, drugs and vaccines proceed through the same
regulatory channels as all other products, and thus are subject to the same
vagaries of the administrative process.
Finally, positive and effective communications must be ensured
between FDA and those who produce, as well as purchase, drugs and
vaccines for national security. While FDA has a long tradition of
interacting with commercial sponsors, its history with DOD is less
frequent and has, at times, been awkward. Yet DOD, in addition to
conducting research to develop drugs and vaccines to meet specific
military needs, has been the largest and sometimes the only "customer"
for these products. DOD is unlike most sponsors and customers in that it
is like FDA, a federal executive branch agency charged with protecting the
public. Some attention must therefore be given to the unique relationship
between FDA and DOD and the ways in which this relationship may
differ in relevant respects from the typical FDA-sponsor interaction.2 6
V. LESSONS FROM THE PAST: How FDA AND CONGRESS HAVE
ADAPTED TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
While there are reasons for concern, there are also reasons to be
optimistic that FDA has sufficient authority and flexibility to fine-tune its
procedures to better meet national security needs. This section describes
several regulatory changes within FDA that began in the mid 1980s and
that have potential relevance to the agency's ability to facilitate the
availability of drugs and vaccines to counter biological attacks.
A. The Rutherford Era
Over the past two decades, FDA has evolved from a "one-size-fits-all"
regulatory strategy to one that recognizes that the agency's statutory and
regulatory authorities can, and must be, applied flexibly to accommodate
individual circumstances. This has been the case, in particular, with drug
development for life-threatening illnesses. Through a combination of
factors, including sometimes-confrontational episodes with patient
advocacy groups and pressure from industry, FDA has begun to recognize
that those suffering from life-threatening diseases, and facing imminent
death, may have different risk-benefit preferences from those of the
general population, and that such preferences are legitimate and should be
given credence in the form of accelerated approvals and greater access to
unapproved products. This section discusses FDA's regulatory changes,
some of which were subsequently codified by Congress as amendments to
266. See generally, Rettig et al., supra note 125.
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the (FD&C Act),2 67with particular attention to the lessons applicable to the
bioterrorism context.
Prior to the 1980s, FDA provided a single route to drug approval: IND,
Phase I, Phase II and Phase III. Furthermore, the "gold standard" for
successfully completing Phase III was, almost without exception, the
completion of two independently conducted "adequate, well-controlled
clinical trials."2'6 In addition, investigational products could generally not
be given to patients, except in limited circumstances.269
FDA's exclusive authority to require approval as a condition of
marketing, and its concomitant authority to prohibit distribution of any
unapproved product-even for dying patients-was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in the 1979 case, United States v. Rutherford.27 In that
case, terminally ill cancer patients and their families challenged FDA's
injunction against the distribution of Laetrile, an unapproved cancer
therapy.27t FDA contended that this product was a "new drug" within the
meaning of the FD&C Act, and therefore an application for approval must
be submitted, and approval granted by FDA, prior to distribution in
interstate commerce.272 Since no application had been submitted for
Laetrile, FDA held the distribution of the drug to be unlawful.2 73The
patients argued, and the lower courts agreed, that the safety and
effectiveness requirements for new drugs had "no reasonable application
to terminally ill cancer patients., 274 Further, since these patients would
267. 21 U.S.C §301 (2000).
268. Kulynych, supra note 78, at 129.
269. Prior to 1987, FDA had permitted a compassionate use IND exemption on
a case-by-case basis, but only at the request of the patient's primary care physician
and provided that the pharmaceutical company was willing to supply the
investigational drug at no charge. Both of these requirements made the theoretical
possibility of an exemption insufficient to meet the demands of most persons with
AIDS. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA
New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 315-316
(1999/2000); See also Richard J. Nelson, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs:
"Giant Step for the Sick and Dying"?, 77 GEo. L.J. 463, 471 (1988) (noting that the
use of the compassionate IND was "largely ad hoc and not widely publicized.").
FDA also allowed a personal use import exemption, which permitted individual
citizens to import limited quantities of unapproved drugs for their personal
medical use. See Greenberg at 316.
270. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 549-550.
273. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (D. Ok. 1977).
274. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 551 (discussing lower court holdings).
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likely die of their illness regardless of the therapy used, there were "no
realistic standards against which to measure the safety and effectiveness of
a drug for that class of individuals., 2" The Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, holding that the safety and effectiveness provisions applied to all
products, regardless of the illness they were intended to treat.276
Furthermore, the Court disputed the rationale of the lower courts, stating
that even patients suffering from potentially fatal diseases could be
harmed by unproven products if the use of such products caused them to
reject conventional therapy.277
The Supreme Court's validation of FDA's rigorous, cautious and
uniform approach to product approval should not be surprising. Indeed,
the history of the FD&C Act amply demonstrates that its consumer-
protection motivations are embedded in its origins. Each step in
Congress' incremental strengthening of FDA authority was made in
response to consumer deaths from dangerous products: elixir
sulfanilamide, thalidomide and the Dalkon Shield being a few of the more
prominent examples.278 Thus, the entrenched tradition has been to keep
unsafe products out of the marketplace, and to protect vulnerable patients
from "quack" therapies, not to facilitate the entrance of risky but
potentially beneficial products into the marketplace.
B. AIDS and the Waning of Rutherford
The Rutherford decision marked the high water mark in FDA's
unquestioned status as the exclusive final arbiter of safety and
effectiveness. Only a short time later, the emergence of the AIDS
epidemic challenged the agency's core identity as public health protector
and its long-held assumptions about the proper ratio of risk to benefit in
drug development, and ushered in a dramatic shift in the agency's
regulatory perspective. Indeed, the epidemic "marked a seminal event in
the evolution of new drug approval policy at the FDA."27 9
With the emergence of the AIDS epidemic, FDA was faced with a
highly organized, articulate and politically savvy advocacy community.
FDA was also faced with a highly motivated patient body that perceived
275. Id. at 551.
276. Id. at 551-552.
277. Id. at 558-559.
278. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug
Law History, at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last visited
October 24, 2002).
279. Greenberg, supra note 269, at 296.
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itself as literally having nothing to lose by trying unproven therapies.
Frustrated by the Reagan administration's seeming indifference, and by
the apparent slow pace of approval for new drugs, AIDS activists
employed a variety of strategies to advance their agenda. In an
unprecedented demonstration of grassroots protest against the agency,
FDA's Rockville, Maryland headquarters were picketed by protestors, a
thousand strong and many suffering from AIDS, who chanted for hours
demanding faster drug approval.2' ° Protesters also took more subtle, and
potentially more damaging, measures to demonstrate their unwillingness
to accept the established clinical trial system as a means to drug approval.
For example, one AIDS activist group established a method by which
patients could have their clinical trial drug supply analyzed, thus
definitively un-blinding the study." Patients receiving active treatment
shared their drugs with those receiving placebos. 2 Patients also adjusted
their doses and added treatments prohibited by the protocol.283 Finally, an
"underground" distribution network developed for drugs being tested in
clinical trials. The availability of investigational drugs outside the
clinical trial setting impeded efforts to recruit patients to serve in
supervised clinical trials.
It appears that patients and activists undertook such efforts in the belief
that they would maximize not only individual well being, but also patient
well being as a whole. It is unclear how widespread such actions were, but
280. Paul Duggan, 1,000 Swarm FDA's Rockville Office To Demand Approval
of AIDS Drugs, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1988, at B1.
281. Nancy K. Plant, Food Allergy and the Health Care Financing
Administration: A Story of Rage: Adequate Well-Controlled Clinical Trials:
Reopening the Black Box, 1 WID. L. SYMP. J. 267, 286 (1996).
The term "blinding" refers to procedures that prevent participants in a clinical trial
from knowing whether they are receiving the drug being investigated or some




285. In addition, the lack of availability of investigational drugs opened the
door to the use of "untested compounds for which there were anecdotes or
rumors in support of efficacy" and the development of black market buying clubs
for drugs that were available overseas. This occurred "in an environment where
good information about the effectiveness of treatments was unavailable because
the treatments had emerged entirely outside the regulatory purview of the FDA"
leading to "initial desperate enthusiasm for the newest treatment fad [that] would
die down as evidence accumulated to suggest its inefficaciousness." Greenberg,
supra note 269, at 311.
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even if only on a small scale, they posed a symbolic challenge to the
supremacy of the double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial. It is
difficult to quantify the extent to which the efforts of AIDS activists led to
FDA's willingness to consider changes to the status quo. Certainly the
testimony of impassioned, terminally ill individuals arguing for the
autonomy to accept greater risks must have been compelling to at least
some regulators. Moreover, both FDA and the research community were
no doubt seriously concerned about threats to the integrity of the clinical
trial process.2' As has been noted:
HIV patients were the first group of patients ever to disobey the
system in such an organized and widespread fashion. Their
disregard for the traditional drug development system, expressed
both from outside the system and as quietly errant cogs in the
drug development wheel, drew attention to these issues in a way
that had never been done. 7
Whatever the motivation, FDA made several dramatic regulatory
changes to the clinical trial process in the 1980s and early 1990s. While
FDA, in the early 1980s, was able to informally improvise strategies to
expedite new AIDS drug approvals, 8  ultimately, a more formal
enunciation of policy was required. In 1987, after receiving over 300
comments from a wide array of interest groups, FDA issued a final rule
specifying the conditions under which investigational new drugs could be
administered to patients with severe medical conditions.8 9  FDA
articulated the purpose of the rule as facilitating "the availability of
286. Indeed, some of these threats were rather dire: At one FDA Advisory
Committee meeting concerning early access, AIDS activist Larry Kramer stated:
"If we do not get these drugs you will see an uprising, the likes of which you have
never seen before since the Vietnam War in this country. We will sabotage all of
your phase I studies." Plant, supra note 281 at n.144 (citing Lisa Terrizzi, The
Need for Improved Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Activists and
Their Call for a Parallel Track Policy, 4 ADMIN. L. J. 589, 622 (1991)).
287. Plant, supra note 281, at 289.
288. While FDA's rapid approval of AZT and pentamidine were initially
lauded, critics later found several faults with the research methodology used in
these trials. Greenberg, supra note 269, at 312-313.
289. 52 Fed. Reg. 19466 (May 22, 1987). According to FDA, comments were
received from representatives of "virtually every affected constituency," including
consumers, consumer group leaders, health professionals and health care
providers, representatives of specific disease and orphan drug organizations, State
and local health departments, clinical investigators and research institutions,
institutional review boards, pharmaceutical manufacturers and former FDA
officials. Id.
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promising new drugs to desperately ill patients as early in the drug
development process as possible, before general marketing begins, and to
obtain additional data on the drug's safety and effectiveness. ' '290
The FDA rule provided that a drug could be used for treatment if: (1)
the drug is intended to treat a serious, or immediately life-threatening,
disease; 291 (2) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or
other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended
patient population; (3) the drug is under investigation in a controlled
clinical trial under an IND, or all clinical trials have been completed; and
(4) the sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively pursuing
marketing approval of the investigational drug with due diligence.292
Sponsors seeking to use an IND drug for treatment were required to
submit a treatment protocol to FDA containing information on the
rationale for using the drug, the criteria for patient selection and other
information.293 The sponsor was not required to wait for FDA approval to
begin but rather could begin thirty days after submission unless FDA
directed otherwise. 29 Another important component of the rule was that
FDA permitted a sponsor or investigator to charge for the drug used in a
treatment protocol provided that certain conditions were met. 95 This was
a departure from the prohibition against charging for investigational
products, and provided important incentives to companies to provide their
investigational products to patients.
In 1988, FDA again undertook measures intended to expand access to
investigational products by issuing an interim rule that provided a
mechanism for expediting the development, evaluation and marketing of
290. Id.
291. The rule defined "immediately life threatening" to mean a stage of disease
in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of
months or in which premature death is likely without early treatment. 21 C.F.R. §
312.34(b)(3)(ii) (2002). The preamble to the final rule also provided the following
illustrative list of diseases fitting this definition: Advanced cases of AIDS;
Advanced congestive heart failure (New York Heart Association Class IV);
Recurrent sustained ventricular tachycardia or ventricular fibrillation; Herpes
simplex encephalitis; Most advanced metastatic refractory cancers; Far advanced
emphysema; Severe combined immunodeficiency syndrome; Bacterial
endocarditis; and Subarachnoid hemorrhage. 52 Fed. Reg. 19466, 19467 (May 22,
1987).
292. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
293. 21 C.F.R. § 312.35(a).
294. 21 C.F.R. § 312.35(b).
295. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(2).
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new therapies intended to treat persons with life-threatening'16 or severely
debilitating illnesses.297 The measures were focused especially on those for
which no satisfactory alternative therapies existed. The interim rule
permitted a departure from the classic Phase I, 11111 approach. Instead,
FDA stated that it would consider approval following phase two
investigational studies, without the need for Phase III, which would
represent a potentially significant saving of time:
FDA believes that if sufficient attention is paid to the quality
and amount of data obtained in phase 2, it should be possible to
identify early those drugs that represent safe and effective
treatments for life-threatening and severely-debilitating diseases
- and to develop the evidence needed for their marketing - in
the course of carrying out the first controlled trials."8
This early approval was predicated on early and frequent meetings
between sponsors and FDA reviewers to discuss the design of animal and
clinical studies. FDA anticipated that sponsors would make use of the
treatment protocol provisions established in previous years to administer
the drug to patients while preparing the marketing application. Finally,
FDA anticipated that post-marketing (Phase IV) studies would be used to
obtain additional information about a product's risks, benefits and optimal
uses. Underlying these changes was the explicitly articulated premise that
a different risk-benefit calculus was appropriate for the agency to use in
reviewing product applications intended to treat patients with life-
threatening or seriously debilitating illnesses:2 99
[t]he procedures contained in this rule reflect the recognition
that physicians and patients are generally willing to accept
greater risks or side effects from products that treat life-
threatening and severely debilitating illnesses, than they would
accept from products that treat less serious illnesses. These
procedures also reflect the recognition that the benefits of the
drug need to be evaluated in light of the severity of the disease
being treated.'
296. The rule defined life threatening diseases as: "(1) Diseases or conditions
where the likelihood of death is high unless the course of the disease is interrupted;
and (2) Diseases or conditions with potentially fatal outcomes, where the end point
of clinical trial analysis is survival." 21 C.F.R. § 312.81(a) (2002).
297. The rule defined severely debilitating illnesses as: "diseases or conditions
that cause major irreversible morbidity." 21 C.F.R. § 312.81(b) (2002).
298. 53 Fed. Reg. 41516 (Oct. 21, 1988) (21 C.F.R. pts. 312 and 314).
299. 53 Fed. Reg. at 41518.
300. Id.
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In May 1990, the Public Health Service, another agency under the aegis
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), published a
proposed policy statement specifically aimed at speeding new IND drugs
to people with AIDS and HIV-related illnesses.3 ' The policy statement,
which was issued under the authority of the FD&C Act, proposed to
authorize a "parallel track" under which certain individuals with AIDS or
HIV could receive investigational products at an earlier stage of
development outside the context of a controlled clinical trial.3"2 To be
eligible, a participant (1) had to have clinically significant HIV-related
illness or be an imminent health risk due to HIV-related
immunodeficiency, (2) be unable to participate in a controlled clinical trial
because of (i) failure to meet entry criteria, (ii) severity of illness, or (iii)
full enrollment of the controlled clinical trials; and (3) be unable to take
standard treatment because it is contraindicated, cannot be tolerated or is
no longer effective.3 3
The new drugs would be made available based on studies without
concurrent control groups to monitor drug safety." 4 It was expected that
the drugs at issue would be in the very early stages of development, and
would only be made available to people with no satisfactory alternative
therapy. While data collection was required, the Public Health Service
anticipated that most data for marketing would come from controlled
clinical trials.0 5  The evidence required to administer these drugs to
patients would be less than that required for a treatment IND.3 6 However,
specific criteria to be considered were listed.3 7 A final policy statement
was issued in April 1992.3°
In December 1992, FDA issued regulations to accelerate approval of
drugs for serious or life-threatening illnesses that contained a significant
change to the drug approval process.30 9 FDA stated that such products
301. 55 Fed. Reg. 20856 (May 21, 1990). The proposed statement was
developed by a working group comprising representatives from NIH, FDA, the
Office of the General Counsel and the National AIDS Program Office, as well as
community advocates, physicians, clinical researchers and industry representatives.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 20858-20859.
304. Id. at 20857.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 20858.
308. 57 Fed. Reg. 13250 (April 15. 1992).
309. 57 Fed. Reg. 58942. (Dec. 11, 1992) (codified at various sections of 21
C.F.R. §§314, 601 (1992)).
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could be approved based on data concerning "surrogate endpoints."
Traditionally, FDA had required that if it was claimed that a product
caused or prevented a particular outcome (e.g., cause remission, prevent
death), that outcome must be demonstrated in clinical trials."' However,
certain outcomes may take years to demonstrate, increasing the length of
time required to demonstrate effectiveness.
By contrast, a surrogate endpoint is a "laboratory measurement or
physical sign""' that has been shown to correlate with, and be predictive
of, the outcome of interest. FDA stated that it would permit approval of
drugs to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses "on the basis of adequate
and well-controlled clinical trials establishing that the drug product has an
effect on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely, based on
epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiologic, or other evidence, to predict
clinical benefit."3 2  Products approved based on such data would be
required to undergo additional postmarketing studies confirming the
clinical benefit of the drug.3 3
Under the new regulation, FDA also stated that it could impose post-
marketing restrictions for certain drugs approved under accelerated
procedures.3 4 FDA stated that certain clinically beneficial drugs, such as
those with potential for significant toxicity, could be used safely only if
distribution were limited to certain facilities or physicians or in
conjunction with ongoing monitoring.3"' Restrictions would be tailored to
the specific safety concerns for a particular product. 6
The foregoing reforms produced a sea change in FDA operations, and,
perhaps more significantly, in the agency's conception of its essential
mission. Prior to 1980, the virtually unquestioned mission of FDA was
public health protection, construed narrowly as protecting consumers from
the harmful effects of unsafe products. The AIDS crisis forced both the
agency and the broader medical community to reassess the appropriate
mission and to reconsider the parameters of the "public health." While
the agency always, by the very nature of its mission, had to grapple with
the "conflicting objectives of caution and expedience,""3 7 AIDS dramatized
310. Greenberg, supra note 269, at 323.
311. 57 Fed. Reg. 13234, 13235.
312. Id.
313. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2002).
314. 21 C.F.R. § 314.520.
315. Id.
316. 57 Fed. Reg. 58942.
317. Salbu, supra note 55, at 95.
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the conflict in a way that had not been done before and compelled FDA to
acknowledge that the public health could be compromised not only
through the incautious approval of unsafe or ineffective products but also
by the overly cautious withholding of approval. FDA also acknowledged
that its "traditional mission neglected the interests of people whose lives
were primarily threatened by the absence of treatment, rather than by
unidentified harmful side effects of treatment.,
318
In 1997, Congress formally sanctioned FDA's dual role when it
legislatively codified FDA's mission as comprising both protection of the
public health by ensuring the safety and effectiveness of products and the
promotion of public health, by "promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical
research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of regulated
products in a timely manner.' 9 At the same time, Congress legislatively
codified many of the regulations issued by FDA to accelerate the
availability of drugs to seriously ill patients.3 "0 Significantly, FDAMA
contained an explicit provision permitting the products to be designated as
"fast track" and eligible for expedited review and approval.32'
AIDS also effected a change in FDA's assessment of its role vis-at-vis
the patient and research subject. FDA's regulatory process requires a
constant assessment of the appropriate boundaries of tradeoffs between
risk and benefit; it is "at its heart an exercise in risk management. ,32
Additionally, FDA must choose between substituting its own judgment
about appropriate risk thresholds for public protection and allowing the
public to make independent choices to assume risk. Baldly stated,
requiring a high degree of safety will result in fewer adverse events from
the product, but also more morbidity and mortality from the underlying
disease. Lowering the risk threshold may lead to more adverse events,
including death, but may also prolong some lives and alleviate some
morbidity. It is not usually possible to know in advance whether a given
shift in the risk/benefit profile will result in a net increase or decrease in
morbidity and mortality. Prior to 1980, FDA erred on the side of limiting
access to risky products in order to reduce the risks of treatment to the
patient. The Rutherford decision affirmed FDA's central role of
protecting vulnerable patients from the unproven claims of charlatans.
However, AIDS activists and other patient advocacy groups urged a shift
318. Greenberg, supra note 269, at 328.
319. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)(2002).
320. Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
321. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2002).
322. Greenberg, supra note 269, at 337.
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from FDA-centered risk/benefit decision-making to one that included the
patient's own risk preferences.
The changes of the late 1980s and 1990s demonstrated FDA's
willingness to permit seriously ill people to accept more risk in the interest
of obtaining potentially beneficial treatments. This shift was applauded by
some, who viewed it as a victory of patient autonomy and individual self-
determination over a paternalistic government entity. Others, however,
expressed concern that the changes were potentially detrimental to both
individual patients and the broader research enterprise. For example,
concern was raised that permitting pharmaceutical companies to charge
for treatment INDs would limit access to those patients who could afford
to pay and would also decrease manufacturers' incentives to seek
approval.3" Some also feared that lowering the standards for approval
would compromise overall research quality. Even AIDS activists were
publicly divided about whether faster approval was beneficial, with some
groups expressing concerns that too many drugs were being made
available with too little data about their safety or effectiveness.3 24
The regulatory changes that FDA initiated in response to AIDS-
changes that have been broadened to include other serious diseases
32-
raise issues of particular salience to products to counter bioterrorism. The
emergence of the bioterrorism threat requires a similar reassessment of
the appropriate risk-benefit calculus for optimal military and public health
protection. The statutory and regulatory changes initiated in response to
AIDS can therefore provide both a conceptual and practical framework
for crafting new regulatory mechanisms to better address national security
and homeland defense needs.
C. The Orphan Drug Act
The regulatory changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s were aimed at
getting therapies already under investigation to the patient more quickly.
These changes also indirectly encouraged research and development of
new therapeutic entities, but this was not the main focus of advocates of
reform.
323. Nelson, supra note 269, at 480-481.
324. See e.g., Gina Kolata, F.D.A. Debate on Speedy Access to AIDS Drugs Is
Reopening, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at A13.
325. In March, 1996, for example, FDA unveiled its "cancer drug initiative,"
under which it extended many of its AIDS drug policies to cancer drugs. Salbu,
supra note 55, at 118-119.
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For patients suffering from serious illnesses that affect only a small
number of people, the existence of a therapeutic vacuum, i.e., the absence
of any therapeutic modality, investigational or otherwise, is also a
significant concern. This is because pharmaceutical companies typically
focus their research and development efforts on diseases and conditions
likely to be beneficial for large numbers of people, and thereby to yield
the most sales. Thus, potentially therapeutic compounds with a small
potentially treatable patient population may languish for lack of a sponsor
willing to invest the time and money to conduct clinical trials and shepherd
the drug through the approval process.326
In order to encourage the development of such "orphaned" products,
Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act in 1983.327 The Act provided
several economic incentives to sponsors of these products, perhaps the
most significant being seven years of market exclusivity beginning from
the date of FDA approval."" This means that FDA cannot approve a
marketing application for the same drug approved to treat the same
condition for seven years from the approval date of said orphan drug.
FDA has provided regulatory definitions to guide exclusivity
determinations. 329  Nevertheless, competing sponsors have fiercely
contested the precise boundaries of this exclusivity.
30
To qualify for the incentives provided in the Act, the sponsor must first
obtain orphan drug designation from FDA, by demonstrating that the
product is intended to treat a rare disease or condition.3 ' Initially, the Act
332defined this category based on the lack of expectation of cost recovery.
326. See e.g., David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of
Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD DRUG L.J. 125, 126 (2000).
327. Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
328. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2002). The Act also provided (1) a tax credit for fifty
percent of "qualified clinical testing expenses," 26 U.S.C. § 45C, (2) the
opportunity to obtain written recommendations from FDA regarding the types of
investigations that should be conducted, 21 U.S.C. § 360aa, (3) encouragement to
conduct "open" protocols in order to get investigational products to patients not
enrolled in clinical trials, Id. § 360dd, and (4) federal grants to defray clinical trial
expenses, Id. § 360ee.
329. See, 21 C.F.R. § 316 (2002).
330. See e.g., Genentech v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting
recombinant human growth hormone not the same as cadaver-derived hormone);
Berlex Laboratories, Inc. v. FDA, 942 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting clinically
superior product for the same disease can receive orphan drug designation).
331. Pub. L. No. 97-114, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
332. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1982)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360bb(a)(2) (1994)); see also Gary A. Pulsinelli,
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This definition required sponsors to submit, and FDA to evaluate, data
demonstrating a lack of commercial feasibility."' As a result of this
cumbersome requirement, few sponsors sought designation. In 1984,
Congress amended the Act to provide an additional test based solely on
the number of people in the population affected with a disease.335 The Act
defines "rare disease and condition" as:
any disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000
persons in the U.S. or (B) affects more than 200,000 persons in
the U.S. but for which there is no reasonable expectation that
the cost of developing and making available in the U.S. a drug
for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the
U.S. of such drug.336
FDA issued final regulations in 1992... in which it set forth the data
required to demonstrate that a drug is unlikely to be profitable,
notwithstanding the fact that it affects more than 200,000 people.33 In
practice, however, all sponsors seeking designation have relied on the
definition provided in subsection (a).339
Since the passage of the Act, FDA has designated 944 products as
orphan drugs,"40 and has approved 227 of these products for marketing.'
The Act has been subject to criticism on the basis that it has been used by
some companies as a means to gain the economic benefits of the Act for
products that are not truly "orphans," i.e., that are highly profitable.
According to critics, this has been accomplished in some cases through the
practice of "salami slicing," meaning artificially dividing a disease into
arbitrary subsets in order to meet the 200,000 patient limit, and in others
through monopolistic pricing.342 Even drugs that legitimately qualify at the
outset may "outgrow" their designation as the incidence of the disease
The Orphan Drug Act: What's Right With It?, 15 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J.
299, 307 (1999).
333. Pulsinelli, supra note 332.
334. Id. at 307; see also Rohde, supra note 326, at 129.
335. Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2815 (1984).
336. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2).
337. 57 Fed. Reg. 62076 (Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 21 CFR pt. 316).
338. 21 C.F.R. § 316.21(c)(2002).
339. Pulsinelli, supra note 332, at 313.
340. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, LIST OF ORPHAN PRODUCT
DESIGNATIONS AND APPROVALS, available at http://www.fda.gov/orphan/
designat/list.htm (last visited July 2, 2002).
341. Id.
342. Pulsinelli, supra note 332, at 321.
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increases in the population. For example, the first drugs approved for
AIDS, AZT and pentamidine isethionate, were approved pursuant to an
orphan drug designation. While the actual patient population at the time
of designation may have been under 200,000, it quickly grew as the
number of infected patients, and the number who could potentially benefit
from the drug increased.3 3 The statute does not provide any mechanism
for revoking the orphan drug designation under these circumstances,
although such an amendment to the Act has been proposed."
Notwithstanding the flaws that have been identified, some of which may
be correctable by legislation or regulation, and others that may be
inherent, more products to treat rare diseases and conditions are available
as a result of the Act than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, the
statute did achieve its goal of correcting a defect of the free market to the
benefit of at least a subset of patients.
Like drugs for rare diseases or conditions, products to counter
bioterrorism may also be considered therapeutic "orphans." As discussed
earlier, the vaccine industry is fragile in part because it is not viewed as an
economically fertile ground for product development. The Orphan Drug
Act therefore provides a model for promoting innovation that has
particular relevance to products to combat bioterrorism. In particular, the
inclusion within the statutory framework of products for which there is a
lack of expectation of cost recovery would appear to have particular
applicability to such products. Thus the Orphan Drug Act, either as
written or with targeted legislative amendments or regulatory
clarifications, can be an important vehicle to overcome the absence of
appropriate treatments and to encourage innovation in this area.
VI. CURRENT INITIATIVES FROM CONGRESS AND FDA
Since October 2001, Congress has introduced numerous bills addressing
various aspects of bioterrorism. While some bills have sought additional
appropriations to purchase drugs and vaccines,345 the bills have not sought,
343. Id. at 323.
344. Id. at 333-337.
345. See e.g., Matt Kelly, Ganske's Bioterrorism Bill Mirrors Senate's; The
Legislation Includes $1.1 Billion to Help Prevent and Respond to Agricultural
Terrorism, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 17, 2001, at 11a; Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
A Nation Challenged: Bioterrorism; Senators Seek $3.2 Billion to Fight Germ
Threats, Doubling Bush Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at B8.
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for the most part, to directly alter FDA's authority over drugs and
vaccines. 46
One exception has been the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 7which was enacted into law on
June 12, 2002 .8 As previously mentioned, this law extended PDUFA
authorization for an additional five years.' 9 In addition, the new law
contains provisions intended to spur the development of "priority
countermeasures.' 35o The law authorizes the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to designate a priority countermeasure as a "fast-track"
product under the FD&C Act3"' upon request from the product's
sponsor.352 Additionally, the new law mandates annual registration with
FDA of foreign manufacturers engaged in the import of drug and device
products into the United States and authorizes the exclusion of products
from unregistered establishments.53
Other bills containing FDA-related provisions are still pending, and are
unlikely to pass in the waning days of the 107th Congress. For example, in
346. Indeed, the only area in which Congress has sought to significantly amend
FDA's authority has been with regard to food safety, but these proposed changes
have encountered significant resistance by the food industry. See e.g., Robert
Pear, Food Industry's Resistance Stalls Bill to Protect Food , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2002, at A22; Bill Lambrecht, Safety of Nation's Food Supply is Scrutinized;
Bioterrorism Legislation Also May Address Issue of Food-Borne Illnesses, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2001, at Al.
347. 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2002).
348. Pub. L. No. 107-188,116 Stat 594 (2002).
349. Id. at §502(3)(A).
350. The law defines a "priority countermeasure" as "a countermeasure,
including a drug, medical or other technological device, biological product or
diagnostic test, to treat, identify, or prevent infection by a biological agent or toxin
listed pursuant to section 351A(a)(1) of the PHS Act or harm from any other
agent that may cause a public health emergency." Id. § 125.
351. Section 506 of the FD&C Act directs FDA to conduct expedited review of
new product applications for products intended for the "treatment of a serious or
life-threatening condition" and that "demonstrate the potential to address unmet
medical needs for such a condition." 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1)(2002).
352. The law also authorizes the Secretary of HHS to award grants and
contracts to facilitate the development of countermeasures for pathogens of
potential use in a bioterrorist attack. Id.
353. Id. § 321. It also directs the Secretary to develop a national stockpile of
drugs, vaccines and other products that might be required in the event of a
bioterrorist attack. It specifically authorizes the Secretary to carry out activities
necessary to ensure the availability of sufficient quantities of smallpox vaccine. Id.
§ 121.
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December 2001, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced a bill that
aims to extend patent terms, provide tax credits and offer indemnification
to firms that develop diagnostic and medical countermeasures to agents
listed on a "biological and chemical agent research priority list. 3 54 Entities
seeking these benefits would be required to register with FDA, and
provide, among other information, the name of the agent or toxin for
which products are being developed and a description of the research to
be undertaken.355 In addition, FDA, in consultation with the Director of
the Office of Homeland Security, would determine whether the "research
to be conducted under such registration is intended to lead to the
development of countermeasures." The bill does not in any way, however,
address the process by which FDA would review and approve such
countermeasures.
Since the events of last fall, FDA has not published any new proposed
regulations relating to bioterrorism. Shortly after the intentional release
of anthrax, FDA published a notice in the Federal Register clarifying that
two generic antibiotics, doxycycline and penicillin G procaine drug
products, were approved for use in cases of inhalational exposure to
Bacillus anthracis and providing dosing regimens for this use.3 6 FDA
encouraged manufacturers to submit applications to change the labeling of
their products to add this new dosing information.' FDA took this action
in response to concerns about possible shortages of ciprofloxacin, the only
antibiotic with labeling explicitly stating that it was effective to prevent
and treat inhalational anthrax.358
In March 2002, FDA published a draft guidance document for the
industry concerning the development of drugs to treat exposure to
inhalational anthrax.359 The draft guidance is "intended to assist applicants
who wish to plan, design, conduct, and appropriately monitor the studies,
354. S. 1764, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001). The bill is titled the "Robert
Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen, Ottilie Lundgren,
and Lisa J. Raines Biological and Chemical Weapons Research Act" in
commemoration of victims of 9/11 and the intentional distribution of anthrax. Id.
355. Id.
356. 66 Fed. Reg. 55679 (Nov. 2, 2001).
357. Id.
358. Gina Kolata, A Nation Challenged: The Treatments; 2 Drugs Received
Federal Approval Long Ago to Fight Anthrax, Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2001, at B8.
359. FDA also issued a guidance concerning assessing donor suitability and
blood and blood product safety in cases of possible anthrax exposure. 67 Fed. Reg.
1774 (Jan. 14, 2002).
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including clinical studies, for drugs to treat persons exposed to B.
anthracis."3'6 In April 2002, CBER, in cooperation with DOD, held a
public workshop to discuss possible strategies for the efficacy testing of
investigational anthrax vaccines, including the identification of surrogate
markers, in order to expedite the development of new vaccines.36' Finally,
as stated above, in May 2002, FDA issued a final rule permitting a
demonstration of effectiveness for drugs and biological products used to
reduce or prevent the toxicity of chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear substances to be based solely on data derived from animal
studies.362
VII. NEW INITIATIVES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
This paper has identified several impediments to the ability of the
United States ability to protect its military and civilians from biological
attacks. Some of the problems are clearly beyond FDA's capacity to
resolve. For example, FDA cannot require manufacturers to develop or
manufacture particular products, or control the pace of research and
development efforts. Nor can it allocate money for this purpose; indeed
the agency's own budget is dictated by Congress. Nor can FDA intervene
in the day-to-day operations of specific manufacturers to prevent their
failure to comply with FDA requirements. Rather, the agency is limited to
identifying violations through inspection and imposing sanctions if such
violations are not corrected.
There are, nonetheless, several steps that FDA could undertake to
foster the availability of products needed for national security and
homeland defense. Through the development of more transparent and
predictable regulatory mechanisms, FDA could create an environment
more conducive to well-established manufacturers to develop and produce
products for military and homeland defense. Moreover, using already
established statutory and regulatory mechanisms, as both a conceptual and
practical starting point, to expedite drug approval and to provide
economic incentives for product development, FDA can institute
initiatives to foster the timely development, review and approval of
products to counter bioterrorism. This section identifies five initiatives,
some of which specifically target this category of products, others of which
may have broader effect on the availability of many different product
360. Id.
361. 67 Fed. Reg. 17076 (Apr. 9, 2002) (notice of workshop).
362. 67 Fed. Reg. 37988 (May 31, 2002) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 314 and
601).
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categories including those for military and homeland defense. The
initiatives are presented in broad, conceptual form, and are meant to serve
as a template for further discussion and development by policy makers.
A. Establishment of a New Office of Products for Military and
Homeland Defense
A new office should be created within FDA, with the primary purpose
of reviewing and approving INDs and product applications for new drugs
and biological products for military and homeland defense, including those
intended to counter biological agents. A separate budget should be
allocated for this purpose, so that the mission of the office is not
undermined through lack of necessary resources. The new office should
also serve as a liaison between FDA and other federal government
agencies that oversee military and homeland defense matters.
The office should comprise scientific reviewers from both CDER and
CBER, and from CDRH, if needed. These reviewers should receive
special training in the scientific issues likely to arise in conducting clinical
trials for such products, such as the challenges of demonstrating efficacy,
as well as education regarding effective strategies for interaction with
DOD. This training would permit reviewers to guide manufacturers
through the review and approval process more effectively and to address
concerns as they arise.
This new office can be established by FDA, on its own initiative, or by
Congressional legislation. However, a direct budgetary appropriation by
Congress would help ensure that the office had the necessary personnel
and resources to achieve its mission.
B. Creation of a New Interim Category of Product Approval
FDA and/or Congress should develop an interim category of product
approval for military and homeland defense use. This interim designation
would be intended for products about which insufficient information on
safety and effectiveness was available to warrant full approval, but for
which the risks were considered justifiable in light of the particular
military or homeland defense threats at issue. Products receiving such
designation would not be considered investigational. However, such
products would be subject to stringent requirements, including tight
controls on distribution and diligent surveillance of recipients to identify
adverse reactions. The interim designation would be for a specific period
of time, during which the sponsor would be required to continue research
and surveillance efforts. The sponsor would be required to file periodic
reports describing the results of ongoing clinical studies. Recipients would
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be required to be informed of the approval status of the product and of the
mechanism for reporting adverse reactions.
C. Creation of a Fast Track for Military andHomeland Defense
Products
Legislation enacted in 2001 has explicitly authorized the use of FDA's
fast track authority for products to counter bioterrorism. The new law
gives FDA fairly wide latitude in its implementation. FDA should quickly
issue regulations to implement the new law and thereby permit the fast
track approval of such products.
D. Imposition of Time Limits on INDs
FDA must take steps to end the problem of "orphan INDs," i.e.,
products that remain in a perpetually investigational phase. While not all
the products in this situation are for military or homeland defense use, the
orphan IND problem is particularly acute for this category of products for
the reasons previously discussed. FDA can accomplish this by requiring
periodic renewal of, and imposing time limits on, INDs to ensure that
research is being pursued diligently. Currently, IND holders are required
to file annual reports describing the status of research efforts, but the
current regulations do not in any way ensure that INDs are progressing
towards the NDA/BLA stage. The imposition of time limits would
encourage IND holders to file new product applications. While exceptions
to such time limits may be required in some cases, as the pace of research
is often unpredictable, the imposition of time limits in most cases will
encourage IND holders to diligently pursue the investigations that are the
subject of the application.
E. Clarification of the Applicability of Orphan Drug Designation to
Products for Military and Homeland Defense
FDA should encourage manufacturers of products for military or
homeland defense to seek orphan drug designation for these products.
Since the foreseeable population for such products is, potentially, the
entire country, the usual basis for orphan drug designation (patient
population less than 200,000) would be inapplicable. However, for the
reasons already discussed herein, there is a good faith basis to believe that
there is "no reasonable expectation" that manufacturers of these products
will recover the costs of developing these drugs, which is the alternate
basis for receiving orphan drug designation. FDA should therefore revise
its orphan drug regulations to provide that products whose intended use is
solely or primarily for military or homeland defense are automatically
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deemed to meet the criteria for orphan drug designation. Alternatively,
FDA should provide a simple, clearly understandable and easy to follow
method for demonstrating that a particular counter-bioterrorism product
does not have a reasonable expectation of cost recovery.
CONCLUSION
All of the above initiatives could be accomplished without the
enactment of additional legislation. In other words, FDA currently has
sufficient authority to legally accomplish each of these proposals.
Nevertheless, the agency may be reluctant to initiate many, if not all, of
these efforts, (in the absence of specific direction from Congress or the
Executive Branch) particularly those that can be expected to engender
controversy or require a reallocation of significant resources. Such
direction could arise from (1) an order from the Secretary of Health and
Human Services; (2) an Executive Order from the President; or (3) a
Congressional amendment to the FD&C Act. To the extent that
additional financial resources are required to achieve the above initiatives,
an appropriation of funds from Congress may be required.
All the above initiatives would foster the availability of more drugs and
biological products to protect the public from biological attack. However,
in the final analysis, they are necessary but not sufficient. Ultimately, if
FDA is to effectively regulate products for national security, it must, at
least in some respects, "think" like a national security agency. This by no
means requires any lessening of commitment to the scientific process or to
patient safety. It does require a recognition that, just as the presence of
unsafe and ineffective products endanger public health, the absence of
therapeutic agents to counter biological attacks has significant negative
consequences for the health of both the military and civilian populations.
Ultimately it requires a commitment to facilitating the timely and
expeditious development and manufacture of such products using the best
currently available information on safety and effectiveness.
